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INTRODUCTION 
 
Conditional statements have been subjects of several discussions since ancient 
age. Indeed linguistic constructions like ǲIf p, (then) qǳ have always interested many 
philosophers and logicians because of their central role in common reasoning: every 
day we think and act in accordance with conditional statements. Unfortunately, the 
use of these sentences in theoretical and practical reasoning is problematic, leading 
often to absurdities: [ͳ] ǲIf Berlusconi dies, Prodi will win the Elections. If Prodi wins the Elections, 
Berlusconi will resign immediately after the Elections. Therefore if Berlusconi dies, 
Berlusconi will resign immediately after the Elections.ǳ [ʹ] ǲI think Tom must be at home because the lights are on. And if he were not at 
home the lights would be off.ǳ 
[1] is a classical transitive schema whose conclusion is clearly absurd although it 
is a valid representation in deductive theoretical reasoning. [2] is a typical non-
inclusive theoretical reasoning that might be easily invalidate by the additional 
information that sometimes Tom forgets to switch off the lights. 
Not less problematic is the use of conditionals in practical reasoning: [͵] ǲI have heart disease. To decrease the odds of a heart attack I should take medicines.ǳ 
Looking at example [3] from another point of view it seems that people taking 
those medicines could have a heart attack easier than others. Misunderstanding like 
this could mislead the decision maker! So it is very important to pay attention to the 
action every conditional is affecting. 
So, in front of the problematic but essential role of statements like ǲIf p, (then) qǳ 
it is not exhaustive to identify a conditional simply with a sentence characterized by 
a link between the antecedent (p) and the consequent (q). A theory of conditionals 
must be able to show their great importance, when they are acceptable and when 
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they are truth or simply assertive. For certain, this is not an easy task and, although 
a lot of progress has been made in this field, a genuinely unified theory of 
conditionals does not exist yet. Indeed, some theses seem good only for indicative 
and not for counterfactual conditionals (or vice versa) while others work well with 
simple but not with compound ones. A so-called unified theory has to be applied to 
all of these different accounts of conditionals. 
Just to be clear, a simple conditional is that one where the conditional connective 
occurs once (connecting antecedent and consequent), and a compound conditional 
is a compound sentence containing occurrences of conditional connectives in some 
of its proper sub-sentences. 
Regarding the difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals, I 
think there is no better way than the following example to understand it: [Ͷ] ǲIf Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy, someone else did.ǳ (Non-counterfactual or 
indicative conditional) [ͷ] ǲIf Oswald hadn't shot Kennedy, someone else would have.ǳ (Counterfactual 
or subjunctive conditional) 
This is a paradigmatic illustration because it allows to say the first proposition is 
definitely unquestioned and the second is denied.1 Indeed, unless we are not any 
theorist of conspiracy, we can reject [5] in spite of accepting [4]. Moreover, another 
dissimilarity--despite not crucial to acceptance--is that [5] is characterized by a 
modal aspect, such as a necessary link (logical or causal) between antecedent and 
consequent, which seems to be missing in [4]. So, the distinction between indicative 
and counterfactual conditionals is unquestionably pointed out by this example, at 
the expense of those aspiring to a unified theory simply denying this difference.2 
                                                          
1 Ernest W. Adams, ǲSubjunctive and Indicative Conditionalsǳ, Foundations of Language 6, no. 1 
(1970): 89–94. 
2 ǲTherefore there really are two different sorts of conditional; not a single conditional that can 
appear as indicative or as counterfactual depending on the speaker's opinion about the truth of the antecedent.ǳ David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 3. 
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A clarification must be done in order to explain why counterfactual conditionals 
are identified with subjunctives and non-counterfactuals with indicatives, although 
there is not a complete coincidence of these concepts.  First of all, a statement is told ǲcounterfactualǳ when its antecedent evinces an opposite hypothesis to reality and ǲsubjunctiveǳ when there is, according to English grammar, just a ǲwouldǳ in the main clause and a past tense in the if-clause. It can 
happen that sometimes these different properties--interpretative and 
morphological--do not coexist at all, so that some subjunctive conditionals do not 
exclude the possibility of a true antecedent: [͸] ǲIf Chris went to the party this evening, and she probably will go, Tom would 
be enthusiastic.ǳ 
In the same way, it may be possible to use indicative conditionals even if we 
know the antecedent is false: [͹] ǲIf he is handsome, then I am Naomi Campbell!ǳ  
However, many philosophers hold it would be wrong to describe a 
counterfactual merely as a conditional whose antecedent is false. Rather, it would be 
better to identify it as a proposition that invokes in some way the antecedent's 
falsity.3 Indeed when we say: [ͺ] ǲIf Jones were present at the meeting, he would vote for the motion.ǳ 
instead of: [ͻ] ǲIf Jones is present at the meeting, he will vote for the motion.ǳ 
                                                          
3 ǲIt is not their [the antecedent's and consequent's] falsity in fact that puts a Ǯcounterfactualǯ 
conditional into this special class, but the userǯs expressing in the form of words he uses, his belief that the antecedent is false.ǳ John L. Mackie, Truth, Probability, and Paradox (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1973), 71. ǲ'Counterfactual' may seem to be less open to objection. What lies behind this piece of terminology 
is not, of course, that the antecedent is in fact false, but that, in some way, the falsehood of the antecedent is implied, whether the conditional is true or false, well supported or not.ǳ Michael 
Woods, David Wiggins, and Dorothy Edgington, Conditionals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 5. 
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we are pointing out an information rather than another one: with [8] the speaker 
wants to focus the attention on what Jones would do if he were present at the 
meeting--without exclude the fact that he could not be present (so invoking the 
antecedent's falsity)--, instead in [9] it is not important that part of the content 
about Jones' presence (or absence) but, rather, the information concerning the fact 
he intends to vote for the motion.  
Let me present another example: [ͳͲ] ǲIf I went to the prom, would you come with me?ǳ 
[11] ǲIf I go to the prom, will you come with me?ǳ 
In front of these two inferences, the first thought is that who is saying [10] is 
trying a manner to invite me to the prom--he is saying he would like to go to the 
prom with me. Instead, about [11] I could simply think that the guy (maybe a 
neighbor) is offering me just a ride to the party (maybe by car)--I should be totally 
self-confident to think this inference means a romantic date.  
In other words, with [8] and [10] we want to remark just that necessary link 
between antecedent and consequent characterizing, as formerly said, the 
counterfactual conditionals rather than the indicative ones. Therefore, if we do not 
strictly denote counterfactuals with those conditionals whose antecedent is false, 
[8] and [10] could be easily considered as counterfactuals as the following 
conditionals: 
[12] ǲIf Jones had been present at the meeting, he would have voted for the 
motion.ǳ [ͳ͵] ǲIf I had gone to the prom, would you have come with me?ǳ 
Furthermore, if we considered only [12] as a counterfactual but not [8] and [10], 
we should consequently treat the last ones such as contrary-to-facts. In this way we 
would end to confuse the two well-defined classes. Their differences must be quite 
established and a type of conditional does not have to work as a supporter for the 
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other one.4 This idea is entirely shown by examples [4] and [5]: people who accept 
[4] hardly hold [5]. Instead, a person could easily accept both [8] and [12] 
recognizing in them the same counterfactual conditional in two different times.5 
So, in order to facilitate, many philosophers--and I agree--have decided to deal 
with, in general, subjunctive conditionals as counterfactuals and indicative 
conditionals as non-counterfactuals.  
After this brief introduction I shall define the content of my work. Given that the 
literature about conditional statements is vast and the topic has been analyzed by 
different point of view, I prefer not to present a simple list of all theories, but rather 
to focus the attention on some developments from the late 1960s.6 
I will dedicate the first chapter to Frank Ramsey and to the different 
suppositional theories born as interpretations of a piece of his writing--and footnote 
related--appearing in Ramsey 1929. One consists in a probabilistic reformulation, 
known as ǲEquationǳ, that is central in the conditional debate. Many philosophers 
and logicians advanced several proofs in support or against the Equation. A very 
important contribute is that of Adams, who had the worth of extending probabilistic 
logic to conditionals. I will report in which Adams' Hypothesis consists.  
The probabilistic thesis of Adams is not the only suppositional theory advanced. 
Indeed, philosophers like Mackie, Gärdenfors, Harper and Levi (who complements 
                                                          
4 ǲAs has been recognized, what would count as strong, or conclusive, support for a non-counterfactual conditional would not support the corresponding counterfactual.ǳ Woods et al., 
Conditionals, 7. 
5 Surely, an indicative conditional could become counterfactual with the time, but this is not a 
proper distinguishing feature, such as examples [4] and [5] shows–neither [4] correspond to [5] or it 
is [5] in a second moment. At most the indicative ǲIf Oswald didn't kill Kennedy, someone else didǳ could correspond to some kind of counterfactual like ǲIf Oswald hadn't killed Kennedy, Kennedy would be still aliveǳ.  
6 A selective account about the problem of conditionals in the History could be find in David H. 
Sanford, If P, then Q: conditionals and the foundations of reasoning (London: Routledge, 1989). 
About the material conditional, I will present Edgingtonǯs argument, showing ǲ⊃ǳ such as a no good 
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Gärdenfors's work) provided an approach to conditionals in terms of non-
probabilistic Belief Revision, based on the general idea that an epistemic function *, 
for a given state of belief K and an epistemic input p, produces a new suppositional 
state K*p. I will show in which this kind of epistemic logic consists and I will present 
the famous AGM logic. 
The second chapter will present Stalnaker's analysis. It involves the concept of ǲpossible worldǳ: the ontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefs allowing 
the transition from belief conditions to truth conditions. Stalnaker's analysis is known as ǲsemantics of possible worldsǳ and it was developed independently of Lewis. I will 
show such a semantic and the fundamental differences between this one and Lewis' 
thesis.  
Semantics of possible worlds, even working in accordance with Adams' 
hypothesis about simple conditionals, yields some problems in presence of 
compound conditionals. Additionally, a result of Lewis showed that, if the 
probability of conditionals is the conditional probability P(q |p) (as Adams guesses) 
and if the probability of a proposition is always the probability it is true (as 
Stalnaker supports), then any proposition ǲIf p, qǳ whose probability of truth 
coincides with P(q |p) does not exist unless trivializing the Equation. This is the 
famous Triviality Result to which I prefer dedicate a separate chapter. 
So, the third chapter will show the development of the Triviality Result and its 
implications, like the incompatibility between Adams and Stalnakerǯs accounts. So, if 
Stalnaker firstly agreed with the idea the probability of a conditional equals 
conditional probability, in front of Lewis' Result he seems to give up the Equation 
and, in general, a suppositional view. Alternatively, Adams kept on holding his thesis 
inviting to consider conditionals, not as standard propositions, but as particular 
linguistic constructions lacking of truth conditions. For this reason Adams treated 
conditionals only in terms of assertability. His thesis met a lot of supporter especially thanks to Edgington, who presented strong arguments making Adamsǯ 
logic one of the best candidate for indicative conditionalǯs treatment.  
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Though not without difficulty, Adamsǯ approach represents one of the most 
successful theories of conditionals. But the question I raise is this:  
Does the Triviality Result lead necessarily to Adams' conclusion to deny any kind 
of truth conditions and values for indicative conditionals?  
 In other words:  
Might it exist an alternative way to avoid Lewis' Result in accordance with the 
Equation? 
In order to answer to such a question, the fourth chapter will introduce the logic 
of de Finetti, a kind of three-valued logic called ǲLogic of Trieventsǳ. This seems to 
avoid the Triviality Result, but it is definitely no free from trouble. However, some 
limit seems to be overcome by a modified trievents approach, developed by Alberto 
Mura.  
I will dedicate the last chapter to Muraǯs propose, presented firstly as ǲSemantics 
of Hypervaluationsǳ and then improved as ǲTheory of Hypervaluated Trieventsǳ. 
Mura gave a modified account of de Finettiǯs trievents--escaping different arguments 
against the original trievents--with the intent of providing a new semantic for Adamsǯ conditional logic. I will claim that Muraǯs account can be a good candidate 
for a semantic of indicative conditionals, in perfect harmony with Adams analysis. 
Indeed, the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents incorporates Adamsǯ  
p-entailment, allowing an extension of it for all trievents--including compound 
conditionals. In this way we are no more obligated to reject any truth conditions for 
conditionals. 
Moreover, Mura proposed a generalization of the Theory of Hypervaluated 
Trievents able to catch counterfactual conditionals by introducing a new variable K 
representing the corpus of total beliefs.  
In conclusion, this work wants to put in evidence that conditional issue is not 
closed and that different additional ways can be investigated. For example, the 
Theory of Hypervaluations could be a good solution that deserves to be inquired. 
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Indeed, figuring out the limit of hypervaluations about counterfactuals we can also 
aspire to a unified theory for conditional sentences. 
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I 
INTERPRETATIONS OF RAMSEY'S TEST 
 
1. Via Bayesian conditionalization: the Equation 
Let us consider the famous remark in Ramsey 1929: ǲNow suppose a man is in such a situation. For instance, suppose that he has a 
cake and decides not to eat it, because he thinks it will upset him, and suppose that 
we consider his conduct and decide that he is mistaken. Now the belief on which the 
man acts is that if he eats the cake he will be ill, taken according to our above 
account as a material implication. We cannot contradict this proposition either 
before or after the event, for it is true provided the man doesn't eat the cake, and 
before the event we have no reason to think he will eat it, and after the event we 
know he hasn't. Since he thinks nothing false, why do we dispute with him or 
condemn him?  
Before the event we do differ from him in a quite clear way: it is not that he 
believes p, we ݌̅; but he has a different degree of belief in q given p from ours; and 
we can obviously try to convert him to our view.[1] But after the event we both know 
that he did not eat the cake and that he was not ill; the difference between us is that 
he thinks that if he had eaten it he would have been ill, whereas we think he would 
not. But this is prima facie not a difference of degrees of belief in any proposition, for 
we both agree as to all the facts.  
(Footnote) 
[1] If two people are arguing ' If p will q? ' and are both in doubt as to p, they are 
adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about 
q; so that in a sense ' If p, q ' and ' If p, ̅ݍ ' are contradictories. We can say they are 
fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. If p turns out false, these degrees of belief 
are rendered void. If either party believes ݌̅ for certain, the question ceases to mean 
anything to him except as a question about what follows from certain laws or hypotheses.ǳ7 
The procedure for evaluating conditional sentences described in this text is called ǲRamseyǯs Testǳ. It inspired a suppositional analysis for conditionals, where ǲIf p, qǳ is interpreted as a hypothetically supposition that the antecedent p holds 
the believability of the consequent q under that supposition.  Ramseyǯs Test has been interpreted in different ways. Undoubtedly, the most 
famous and argued interpretation is that advanced by some philosophers--like 
                                                          
7 Frank P. Ramsey ሺͳͻʹͻሻ, ǲGeneral Propositions and Causalityǳ, in Foundations of mathematics 
and other logical essays, ed. R. B. Braithwaite (London: Routledge & Kegan, 1931), 246--247. 
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Adams and followers--who focused their attention on the concept of ǲdegree of beliefǳ8, analyzing the remark above in accordance with Ramseyǯs probability 
theory--called ǲlogic of partial beliefǳ by Ramsey himself.9 
Ramsey held that human beliefs cannot be based on an objective theory because 
they are connected to a whole set of epistemic attitudes--through which people 
evaluate, choose and act.10 In this way Ramsey did not mean to deny the existence of 
objective beliefs, but just to suggest to interpret human knowledge in terms of 
partial beliefs able to change in front of new evidences. The logic of partial belief 
                                                          
8 In Ramsey 1926 there is a full paragraph in which the degree of partial belief is defined: ǲThe old-established way of measuring a person's belief is to propose a bet, and see what are the 
lowest odds which he will accept. This method I regard as fundamentally sound; but it suffers from 
being insufficiently general, and from being necessarily inexact. It is inexact partly because of the 
diminishing marginal utility of money, partly because the person may have a special eagerness or 
reluctance to bet, because he either enjoys or dislikes excitement or for any other reason, e.g. to make a book. […]  
In order therefore to construct a theory of quantities of belief which shall be both general and more 
exact, I propose to take as a basis a general psychological theory, […]. I mean the theory that we act in 
the way we think most likely to realize the objects of our desires, so that a person's actions are completely determined by his desires and opinions. […]  
Let us call the things a person ultimately desires ' goods ', and let us at first assume that they are numerically measurable and additive. […]  
It should be emphasized that in this essay good and bad are never to be understood in any ethical 
sense but simply as denoting that to which a given person feels desire and aversion. 
The question then arises how we are to modify this simple system to take account of varying 
degrees of certainty in his beliefs. I suggest that we introduce as a law of psychology that his behavior 
is governed by what is called the mathematical expectation ; that is to say that, if p is a proposition 
about which he is doubtful, any goods or bads for whose realization p is in his view a necessary and 
sufficient condition enter into his calculations multiplied by the same fraction, which is called the ' 
degree of his belief in p '. We thus define degree of belief in a way which presupposes the use of the mathematical expectation.ǳ Frank P. Ramsey ሺͳͻʹ͸ሻ, ǲTruth and Probabilityǳ, in Foundations of 
mathematics and other logical essays, 172--174. 
9 I personally agree with the suggestion to analyze this passage taking into account Ramseyǯs 
philosophy.  
10 An analogous idea was developed by de Finetti. He presented contemporaneously but 
independently the same philosophy of probability advanced by Ramsey, and published in the same year of Ramseyǯs posthumous considerations in: Bruno de Finetti ሺͳͻ͵ͳሻ, "Sul significato soggettivo 
della probabilità", in Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 17, 298--329.   
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wants to be just a way to calculate our beliefs such as subjective probabilities, 
establishing Bayesǯ theorem as the general rule to determine the probability update. Ramseyǯs approach for defining probability laws in terms of degrees of belief 
made some philosophers consider Ramsey 1929 as the application of probability 
logic--that according to Ramsey is a logic of partial belief--to conditional sentences. So, they interpreted Ramseyǯs Test via classical Bayesian conditionalization, inviting 
to measure the probability of ǲIf p, qǳ by conditioning on p, that is identifying the 
probability of a conditional with the conditional probability on q given p. This 
represents the reformulation of Ramseyǯs Test in a probabilistic thesis known as ǲEquationǳ: 
P(p ⟶q) = P(q | p) [where P(p) >0]11 
To properly understand what conditional probability and conditioning are it 
would be appropriate to make some references to Thomas Bayes, who was able to 
found an updating rule establishing how to adjust our degree of belief when we 
acquire new information. This law says the probability of any event b, after learning 
that a  is true (and nothing else), may be changed. How? The rule prescribed in 
Bayesian literature is to match the posterior probability of b (Pt1(b)) with the prior 
probability of b given a (Pt0(b |a)). This is just the Bayesian conditionalisation--
where Pt0(b |a) is told conditional probability--and it can be formulated in this way:  
If Pt0(a)>0, then Pt1(b) = Pt0(b |a)12 
A simple definition of conditional probability is given in a Bayes' posthumously 
published work: 
                                                          
11 P(p)>0 because of zero-intolerance property of conditionals, according to whom if p has no 
chance of being true, there is not any conditional probability. In other words, nobody use a 
conditional sentence when know that the antecedentǯs probability is Ͳ. Jonathan Bennett, A 
Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 53--57.  
12 Richard Jeffrey offered a generalization of this rule that works when we are not totally sure 
about a: Pt1(b) = Pt0(b|a) Pt1(a) + Pt0(b|~a) Pt1(~a). Richard C. Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision, 2nd ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), 169. 
 14 
Elena Nulvesu, Conditional sentences. Truth conditions and probability, 
Tesi di dottorato in ǲScienze dei Sistemi Culturaliǳ, Università degli studi di Sassari. 
ǲIf there be two subsequent events, the probability of the second b/N and the 
probability of both together P/N, and it being first discovered that the second event 
has also happened, from hence I guess that the first event has also happened, the probability I am right is P/b.ǳ13 
Therefore, the probability that both an event e and an hypothesis h will happen, 
is given by multiplication of the probability of e (P(e)) by that of h under the 
supposition that e occurs (P(h |e)): 
P(h ˄e) = P(h |eሻ ∙ Pሺeሻ 
So the conditional probability is expressed in this ratio: �ሺℎ|�ሻ =  �ሺℎ˄�ሻ �ሺ�ሻ    [where both terms exist and P(e) >0] 
From this definition it derives the well-known Bayes' Theorem, which has the 
merit to have inversely related the probability of a conditional hypothesis given 
some evidence (P(h |e)) and the probability of the conditional evidence on that 
hypothesis (P(e |h)): �ሺℎ|�ሻ =  �ሺ�|ℎሻ ∙ �ሺℎሻ �ሺ�ሻ   [where P(h) >0 and P(e) >0]14 
Who accepts the Equation identifies it as the rule for calculating the probability 
of a conditional sentence. So, in whatever way we interpret the connective ǲ⟶ǳ its 
probability must correspond to  �ሺ�|ℎሻ ∙ �ሺℎሻ �ሺ�ሻ , otherwise the Equation is rejected. For 
instance, because the probability of the material conditional ǲ⊃ǳ is usually different 
                                                          
13 Thomas Bayes, ǲAn Essay Toward Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chancesǳ, Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society of London, vol. 53 (1763): 381.  
14 P(h|e) is the conditional probability of h given e--also known as posterior probability of h in 
front of a new evidence e. P(h) is the prior probability of h, that is the degree of belief in an 
hypothesis h--before knowing any information about e. P(e) is the prior probability of e and--unlike 
P(e|h)--it does not take into account any information about h. P(e|h)--posterior probability of e given 
h--is told likelihood of e given fixed h. 
Anyway, this is the simplest form of the theorem, derivable by conjunction rule. However, other versions of it exist. See Tim McGrew, ǲEight versions of Bayes's theoremǳ ሺʹͲͲͷሻ: 
http://homepages.wmich.edu/~mcgrew/Bayes8.pdf 
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from the conditional probability, the supporters of the Equation exclude that ǲ⟶ǳ can be ǲ⊃ǳ. 
Many arguments have been advanced pro and against the Equation, occupying a 
central role into the debate about conditionals that characterized the whole second 
part of 20th century.  
 
2. Adamsǯ thesis 
Ernest Adams is one of the first supporters of the Equation. Indeed Bennett 
wrote: ǲThis powerful, simple, and attractive thesis was first made widely known by 
Stalnaker (1970), and it has been called 'Stalnaker's Hypothesis'. But he tells me 
that Ernest Adams and Richard Jeffrey propounded it before he did; and Adams says 
that Brian Ellis deserves equal credit; so I shall leave personal names out of it, and follow Edgington in calling it the Equation.ǳ15 
Since mid-90s, Adams showed powerful arguments defending the probabilistic interpretation of Ramseyǯs Test, so that some philosophers started to talk about 
Ramsey-Adams Thesis. Adamsǯ analysis is restricted to indicative conditionals and started observing 
that the standard use of propositional calculus leads to fallacies when its application 
involves conditional sentences. So, the problem Adams raised concerns how we 
have to use formal logic in conditional treatment. Indeed, he showed that a lot of 
cases16 which are classically valid--in the sense that it is impossible for the premises 
to be true while its conclusion is false--are rejected (or at least doubtful) by the 
common sense, leading to different kinds of fallacies. 
Adams identified the trouble with the fact that when we deal with conditional 
statements, the term ǲtrueǳ has a no so clear application. For this reason, he 
proposed to find a kind of validity that does not involve the notion of truth, with the 
                                                          
15 Jonathan Bennett, A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals, 57. 
16 In Adams 1965 we can found 9 fallacies about the application of propositional calculus. See 
Ernest W. Adams, ǲThe Logic of Conditionalsǳ, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. 8 (1965): 166--197.  
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intent to analyze conditional sentences from a point of view and not in terms of 
their truth conditions. So, he substituted the concept of classical validity with that of ǲreasonablenessǳ, whose condition is:  ǲIf an inference is reasonable, it should not be the case that on some occasion the 
assertion of its premises would be justified, but denial of its conclusion also justifiedǳ17. 
So, while classical validity involves the notion of true, the reasonableness 
concerns that one of justified assertability, which is not a construct typically 
mathematical or scientific but rather a concept whose content is dictated by the 
context of the assertion. Indeed, an assertion of a statement is justified if and only if 
what is known on that occasion gives us either the certainty or the probability that 
the same statement will be true and a bet on it will be won. In the same way, the 
denial of that assertion is justified if and only if we have either the certainty or the 
probability that the statement will be false and the bet will be lost. Adams called the 
assertion strictly justified in case of certainty and probabilistically justified when 
the statement is just probable. 
What about the assertion of ǲIf p, qǳ? Adams converted the above notions in 
terms of conditional bets18--any bets on conditional statements--giving such a ǲbettingǳ criterion of justification:  ǲa. The assertion of a bettable conditional Ǯif p then qǯ is strictly justified on an 
occasion if what is known on that occasion makes it certain that either p is false or q 
is true; its denial either p is false or q is false. 
b. The assertion of a bettable conditional Ǯif p then qǯ is probabilistically justified 
on that occasion if what is known on that occasion makes it much more likely that p 
and q are both true than that p is true and q is false; its denial is probabilistically 
                                                          
17 Ernest W. Adams, ǲThe Logic of Conditionalsǳ, 171.  
18 The notion of conditional bet was introduced first by de Finetti ͳͻ͵ͳ in: Bruno de Finetti, ǲSul significato soggettivo della probabilitàǳ, Fundamenta Mathematicae (1931): 298--329. See also 
Bruno de Finetti, ǲLa Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectivesǳ, Annales de l'Institut 
Henri Poincaré 7 (1937), 1--68. Translated as ǲForesight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sourcesǳ, in 
Studies in Subjective Probability, eds. H. E. Kyburg Jr. and H. E. Smokler (New York: Robert E. Krieger, 
1980). 
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justified if it is much more likely that p is true and q is false than that p and q are 
both true. 
c. (Definition) The assertion and denial of a bettable conditional Ǯif p then qǯ are 
both vacuously probabilistically and strictly justified on an occasion if what is 





p ՜ q ~(p ՜ q) ≡ p ՜~q 
Strictly justified ~p שq ≡ P(~p שq)=1 ~p ש~q ≡ P(~p ש~q)=1 
Probabilistically justified P(p רq) >P(p ר~q) P(p ר~q) >P(p רq) 
Vacuously strictly and 
probabilistically justified ~p ≡ P(p)=0 ~p ≡ P(p)=0 
 
In case of vacuously justification, the inference and its denial may be asserted as 
well because the bet is not lost but just called off--according to the betting criterion. 
However, Adams pointed out that when we are sure the bet will be called off we will 
not stake at all and no indicative conditional is actually asserted. Indeed, in those 
cases in which we are sure about antecedentǯs falsity we will use a subjunctive 
conditional--no object of Adamsǯ analysis. 
Taking into account the notion of vacuous conditional, Adams reformulated the 
general condition for reasonableness of an inference saying that it cannot be the 
case the assertion of its premises and the non-vacuous denial of its conclusion are 
both justified on the same occasion. 
In view of this notion of reasonableness, Adams showed that absurd cases 
classically valid--for example, the material conditionalǯs fallacies--are not as much 
                                                          
19 Ernest W. Adams, ǲThe Logic of Conditionalsǳ, 176--177. 
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valid for the betting criterion of justification. Indeed, inferences like ǲIf Brown wins 
the election, Smith will retire to private life. Therefore, if Smith dies before the 
election and Brown wins it, Smith will retire to private lifeǳ20 are classically valid but 
not reasonable, because both the assertion of the premises and the negation of the 
conclusion are justified. 
In Adams 1965, we can find an informally presentation of a reasonablenessǯ 
criterion using the standard probability calculus. Adams concluded that this first 
analysis, though solving several problems in conditional treatment, shows some 
critical limitation. For example, its application lacks with conditionals derived from 
suppositions and with compounds involving conditionals. So, he advanced the 
hypothesis that, maybe, assertable conditionals observe different logical laws, other 
from those one of the standard propositional calculus. 
Trying to overcome these limitations, in Adams 196621 the original idea is formalized with some adjustment. First of all, the notion of ǲjustified assertabilityǳ is now replaced by that of ǲhigh probabilityǳ, and the criterion of reasonableness is 
consequently given simply substituting ǲtrueǳ with ǲhigh probabilityǳ in the 
definition of classical validity: ǲan inference is reasonable  just in case it is impossible for its premises to have high probability while the conclusion has low probabilityǳ22. 
Then, in Adams 1975, a consequence of this assumption is made explicit, 
introducing a technical term called ǲuncertaintyǳ ሺu = ͳ– probability). So, in case of 
reasonable inference: ǲ[…] the uncertainty of its conclusion cannot exceed the uncertainty of its 
premises (where uncertainty is here defined as probability of falsity […]ሻǳ.23 
                                                          
20 Ernest W. Adams, ǲThe Logic of Conditionalsǳ, ͳ͸͸. 
21 Ernest W. Adams, ǲProbability and the Logic of Conditionalsǳ, in Aspects of Inductive Logic, eds. J. 
Hintikka and P. Suppes (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1966), 265--316. 
22 Ernest W. Adams, ǲProbability and the Logic of Conditionalsǳ, 266. 
23 Ernest W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals. An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic 
(Dordrecht: Synthese Library, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1975), 2. 
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The concept of uncertainty is fundamental in Adams because through it he could 
totally avoid any concept of falsity in the definition of validity. 
Therefore, in Adamsǯs hypothesis the strict connection between high probability 
and truth, characterizing unconditional statements, instead lacks for conditionals24. 
Indeed, Adams advanced the idea according to which the probability of a conditional 
statement should not be interpreted as probability of being true but rather as 
conditional probability. Thus, Adams identified the Equation as a fundamental 
assumption of his analysis, making his thesis one of the most important arguments 
in defense of the Equation itself. 
A complete formal presentation of his theory can be found in Adams 1975. Let 
me give a summary: 
 Syntactical concepts and terminology: 
o Factual language L  : language generated by any set of sentential 
variables (capital letter like ǲAǳ, ǲBǳ, etc.) together with the two sentential 
constant ǲTǳ and ǲFǳ (for logical truth and falsehood respectively). It is a 
sublanguage of another if all of its formulas are also formulas of the other 
one. It is a finite language if it contains a finite number of atomic 
formulas.  
o Factual formulas (lowercase Greek letters like ǲϕǳ, ǲɗǳ, ǲηǳ, etc.): 
formulas of a factual language. 
o Conditional formulas of L  : every expression of the form ǲϕ ⇒ ɗǳ, where 
the antecedent ϕ and the consequent ɗ are formulas of L   and ϕ is not 
false. The connective ǲ⇒ǳ occurs just as a main connective in a formula 
(the antecedent and the consequent are not conditional formulas 
themselves). 
                                                          
24 ǲThe probability of a proposition is the same as the probability that it is true. […] What we want 
to argue next is that there is a much more radical divergences between the two soundness criteria in 
application to inferences involving conditional propositions, which is ultimately traceable to the failure of the probability equals probability of truth assumption in application to conditionals.ǳ See 
Ernest W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals. An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic, 2. 
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o Conditional extension: the set of all formulas of L   together with all 
conditional formulas. The conditional extension is called conditional 
language and L   is its factual basis. Both factual and conditional formulas 
of a conditional language are represented by script capitals variables like ǲA   ǳ, ǲB  ǳ, etc., while capital letters like ǲXǳ, ǲYǳ, etc., stand to the sets of 
these formulas. 
o Conditionalization of a factual formula ϕ: T ⇒ ϕ. A factual formula and its 
conditionalization are probabilistically equivalent. 
o Material counterpart of a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ ɗ: the factual formula ϕ ⊃ɗ. If the antecedent ϕ is non-logically true, then the material 
counterpart ϕ ⊃ɗ is never probabilistically equivalent to ϕ ⇒ ɗ. 
o Contrary of a conditional: ~(ϕ ⇒ ɗ) = ϕ ⇒~ɗ. 
o Quasi-conjunction of a finite non-empty set of conditional formulas  
X = {ϕ1 ⇒ɗ1, … , ϕn ⇒ɗn}: C(X) =ሺϕ1 ש…ש ϕn) ⇒ [(ϕ1 ⊃ɗ1) & …  
& (ϕn ⊃ɗn)]. 
o Quasi-disjunction defined for finite sets X of conditional formulas:  
D(X) =(ϕ1 ש…ש ϕn) ⇒ [ሺϕ1 & ɗ1) ש… ש (ϕn & ɗn)]. 
 Truth-conditional semantics: 
o Truth-assignment for a factual language L  : a function t  which fixes a 
value of truth or falsity for the formulas of L , so that t(T)=1 and t(F)=0. 
Regarding formulas like ϕ ⊃ɗ, t(ϕ ⊃ɗ) is 1 if and only if either tሺϕ)=0 or 
t(ɗሻ=1, so that ǲ⊃ǳ is the material conditional. A finite language has a 
finite number of different t. 
o State-description: a formula ϕt corresponding to every t of a finite 
language such that, for any factual formula ϕ of L , Eሺϕሻ=1 if and only if ϕ is logically consistent with ϕ1. 
o Verification of a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ɗ under t: if tሺϕሻ=tሺɗሻ=1. Its 
material counterpart is also verified under t if and only if the conditional 
is not falsified (although ϕ ⇒ ɗ could be not verified either) under t. If  ϕ ⇒ɗ is verified, its contrary ϕ ⇒~ɗ is falsified. 
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o Falsification of a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ɗ under t: if tሺϕሻ=1 and  tሺɗሻ=0. Its material counterpart is also falsified under t if and only if the 
conditional is falsified under t. If ϕ ⇒ɗ is falsified, its contrary ϕ ⇒~ɗ is 
verified. 
o Neither verification nor falsification of a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ ɗ under 
t: if tሺϕሻ=0. 
o Verification and falsification of a factual formula ϕ under t: by identifying 
it with its conditionalization T ⇒ϕ, so that ϕ is verified or falsified when tሺϕሻ is 1 or 0. A factual formula cannot be neither verified nor falsified. 
o Verification of a quasi-conjunction C(X) under t: if no member of X is 
falsified and at least one is verified under t. In this case X is confirmed by 
t. Generally, X is confirmable if there exists a truth-assignment confirming 
it. 
o Falsification of a quasi-conjunction C(X) under t: if at least one member of 
X is falsified under t. 
o Neither verification nor falsification of a quasi-conjunction C(X) under t: 
if no member of X is neither verified nor falsified under t. 
o Verification of a quasi-disjunction D(X) under t: if at least one member of 
X is verified under t. 
o Falsification of a quasi-disjunction D(X) under t: if no member of X is 
verified and at least one is falsified under t. In this case X itself is 
disconfirmed by t. Generally, X is disconfirmable if there exists a truth-
assignment confirming it. 
o Some verification equivalency: ~(~A  )≡~A  ; C(~X)≡~D(X); 
D(~X)≡~C(X). t confirms X if and only if it disconfirms ~X and t 
disconfirms X if and only if it confirms ~X. 
 Probability definitions: 
o Probability-assignment of a factual language L : a function P assigning, 
for every formulas of L , a real number between 0 and 1 so satisfying the 
Kolmogorov Axioms according to which if ϕ logically entails ɗ then  
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Pሺϕሻ ൑Pሺɗሻ and P(T)=1, and if ϕ and ɗ are logically inconsistent then  
P(ϕ שɗ) =Pሺϕሻ +Pሺɗሻ. A probability-assignment is a truth-assignment 
only in case it assigns one of the two extreme values (1 and 0). If the 
language is finite, the probability of any proposition ϕ equals the sum of 
the probabilities of the truth where it would be true: Pሺϕሻ =P(t1)t1ሺϕሻ + …+P(tn)tnሺϕሻ. If P is a probability function for L , and L   is a sublanguage 
of L  ǯ, then there is a probability function Pǯ  for L  ǯ such that:  Pǯሺϕሻ =Pሺϕሻ for all ϕ in L . 
o Uncertainty of a factual formula ϕ of L   relative to P: upሺϕሻ =Pሺ~ϕሻ = 
1 –Pሺϕሻ, that is the number measuring the degree to which ϕ is 
considered unlikely. If ϕ entails ɗ, then up(ɗ) ൑upሺϕሻ  and upሺϕ1 &… 
& ϕn) ൑ upሺϕ1) +…+upሺϕn). 
o A probability-assignment is proper for a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ɗ if 
P(ϕ)≠0, and it is proper for X if it is proper for all conditional formulas of 
X. 
o Conditional probability of a conditional formula ϕ ⇒ɗ relative to a 
probability-assignment P for L  : �ሺ� & �ሻ�ሺ�ሻ . 
o Uncertainty of ϕ ⇒ɗ  relative to P : 1–Pሺϕ ⇒ ɗ ሻ. 
o Some properties of conditional probability and uncertainty:  Pሺϕሻ =P(T ⇒ϕሻ; if ϕ is the material counterpart of A , P(A ) ൑ Pሺϕሻ; 
P(~A ) =1–P(A ); P(~D(X)) =P(C(~X)) ; P(~C(X)) =P(D(~X)) ;  
P(D(X)) ൑ the sum of the probabilities P(B ) for B  in X ; up(C(X)) ൑ the 
sum of the uncertainties up(B ) for B  in X. Properties Pሺϕሻ=P(T ⇒ϕሻ 
and P(~D(X))=P(C(~X)) entail that Pሺϕሻ and P(T ⇒ϕሻ, ~D(X) and 
C(~X), ~C(X) and D(~X)  are probabilistically-equivalent. If two formulas 
are verification-equivalent, they are also probabilistically-equivalent. 
o General rule which follows from the generalization of Pሺϕሻ =P(t1)t1ሺϕሻ + …+P(tn)tnሺϕሻ:  
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�ሺ� ⇒ �ሻ = �ሺ�ଵሻ�ଵሺ�&�ሻ + ⋯ + �ሺ�௡ሻ�௡ሺ�&�ሻ�ሺ�ଵሻ�ଵሺ�ሻ + ⋯ + �ሺ�௡ሻ�௡ሺ�ሻ  
where ti are the truth-assignment for L . 
This rule says that the probability of a conditional formula equals the 
ratio between the probability of its being verified and the probability of 
its being either verified or falsified. 
 Probability consistency: 
o [DEFINITION 1]. Let L   be a factual language and let X be a set of 
formulas of its conditional extension. X is probabilistically-consistent  
(p-consistent) if and only if for every real number � > Ͳ, there exists a 
probability-assignment p for L   which are proper for X such that  
P(A  ) ൒ ͳ– � for all A   in X. 
o [THEOREM 1]. Let L   be a factual language, let p be a probabilistically 
assignment for L , and let X be a finite set of formulas of the conditional 
extension of L   such that p is proper for X. 
1.1. If there exists a non-empty subset of X which is not confirmable, 
then the sum of the uncertainties �p(A  ) for A   in X is at least 1, 
and hence X is not p-consistent. 
1.2. If every non-empty subset of X is confirmable then X is  
p-consistent. 
o [THEOREM 2]. Let A   be a factual or conditional formula, let X be a finite 
set of such formulas, and let XǮ  be the set of material counterparts of 
formulas in X. 
2.1. If XǮ  is logically inconsistent than X is probabilistically inconsistent  
(p-inconsistent). 
2.2. If X is p-inconsistent and contains at least one factual formula and 
no proper p-inconsistent subsets of X, then XǮ  is logically 
inconsistent. 
2.3. If X is p-consistent than either X ׫ {A  } or X ׫ {~A  } is  
p-consistent. 
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o [THEOREM 3]. Let L   be a factual language, let A   and B  be formulas of 
its conditional extension, and let X be a finite set of such formulas. Let p 
be a probability-assignment for L   which is proper for A , B  and X. Let  
A   Ǯ be the material counterpart of A   and let XǮ  be the set of all material 
counterparts of formulas in X. 
3.1. If X p-entails A   then �p(A  ) is no greater than the sum of the 
uncertainties �p(B  ) for B  in X. 
3.2. If X does not p-entail A   then for all � > Ͳ there exists a 
probability-assignment q for L   which is proper for A   and X such 
that q(B  ) ൒ 1– ℰ for all B   in X, but q(A  ) ൑ ℰ. 
3.3. If X is p-consistent and p-entails A   then XǮ  logically entails A   Ǯ. 
3.4. If XǮ logically entails A   Ǯ and A   is factual, then X p-entails A .  
3.5. X p-entails A   if and only if X  ׫ {~A  } is p-inconsistent; X  
p-entails all formulas if and only if it is p-inconsistent . 
3.6. If both X  ׫ {B } and X  ׫ {~B  } p-entail A   then X p-entails A . 
3.7. If A   is conditional, X contains at least one factual formula, and X 
p-entails A   but no proper subset of X p-entails A , then X p-entails 
both the antecedent and consequent of A . 
3.8. If ǲAǳ is a sentential variable not occurring in X and ϕ is a factual 
formula, then X p-entails A ⇒ϕ if and only if either X is  
p-inconsistent or A ⊃ϕ is logically true. 
 Probabilistic entailment: 
o [THEOREM 4]. Let L   be a factual language, let ϕ, ɗ and η be formulas of 
L , let A   be a formula of the conditional extension of L , and let X and Y  
be finite sets of such formulas. 
4.1. X p-entails all of its members, and if X p-entails all of members of Y 
and Y p-entails A , then X p-entails A . 
4.2. X p-entails A   if and only if A   is derivable from X using the 
following seven rules of inference:  
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[R1]. T ⇒ ϕ and ϕ are interderivable. 
[R2]. If ϕ is logically consistent and ϕ and ɗ are logically 
equivalent then ϕ ⇒ η can be derived from ɗ ⇒ η. 
[R3]. If ϕ is logically consistent and logically entails ɗ, then  ϕ ⇒ ɗ can be derived from the empty set. 
[R4]. (ϕ ש ɗ) ⇒ η can be derived from ϕ ⇒ η and ɗ ⇒ η. 
[R5]. If ϕ & ɗ is logically consistent then (ϕ & ɗ) ⇒η can be 
derived from ϕ ⇒ η and ϕ ⇒ ɗ. 
[R6]. ϕ ⇒ η can be derived from ϕ ⇒ ɗ and (ϕ & ɗ) ⇒η. 
[R7]. If ϕ is logically consistent but ϕ & ɗ are logically 
inconsistent, then anything can be derived from ϕ ⇒ ɗ. 
4.3. Assume that A1,…, An and B are distinct sentential variables of L . 
There is no set X of formulas of the conditional extension of L   
with less than n members which is p-equivalent to the set  
{A1 ⇒ B,…, An ⇒ B } in the sense that all members of X are  
p-entailed by this set and X p-entails all members of this set. 
o Derived rules: 
[R8]. If ϕ logically implies ɗ then η ⇒ ɗ can be derived from  η ⇒ ϕ. 
[R9]. ϕ ⇒ሺɗ & ηሻ can be derived from ϕ ⇒ ɗ and ϕ ⇒ η. 
[R10]. ϕ ⇒ ɗ can be derived from ϕ ⇒ሺɗ & ηሻ. 
[R11]. (ϕ ∨η) ⇒(ϕ ⊃ɗ) can be derived from ϕ ⇒ ɗ. 
[R12]. (ϕ1 ∨ϕ2) ⇒((ϕ1 ⊃ɗ1) &(ϕ2 ⊃ɗ2)) is derivable from  ϕ1 ⇒ɗ1 and ϕ2 ⇒ɗ2. 
[R13]. C(S) can be derived from S. 
[R14]. If ϕ1 & ɗ1 logically implies ϕ2 & ɗ2 and ϕ1 ⊃ɗ1 logically 
implies ϕ2 ⊃ɗ2 then ϕ2 ⇒ ɗ2 can be derived from ϕ1 ⇒ɗ1. 
[R15]. If A   and B  are factual or conditional and A   p-entails B  
then B  can be derived from A . 
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Let me focus the attention on the reported general rule  �ሺ� ⇒ �ሻ = �ሺ�ଵሻ�ଵሺ�&�ሻ + ⋯ + �ሺ�௡ሻ�௡ሺ�&�ሻ�ሺ�ଵሻ�ଵሺ�ሻ + ⋯ + �ሺ�௡ሻ�௡ሺ�ሻ  
which represents just a generalization of the idea that probability equals 
probability of truth. This rule entails that truth-conditional validity ensures 
reasonableness (probabilistic-validity) but, according to Adams, it holds only in case 
of factual propositions. Thus, if Adamsǯ supposition is correct, the probability of a 
conditional cannot equal in general the probability it is true.  
The fact that such a link between truth-conditional validity and p-validity holds 
for factual proposition is easily demonstrable. For example, an inference like ǲIt will 
either rain or snow tomorrow (R שS); it will not snow tomorrow (~S); therefore it 
will rain tomorrow (R)ǳ25 is classically valid when R שS and ~S are true, and R is 
true too. Now, suppose that both P(R שS) and P(~S) equal 95%, so that both  
P(~R &~S) and P(S) are of 5%. Under these circumstances, the sum of the 
uncertainties of the premises is of 10%, thus the u(R) ൑10%. This means that, if the 
premises have objective probabilities of 95%, their conclusion has a probability of at 
least 90%, and this connection between objective probabilities and correct 
predictability makes that truth-conditional validity guarantees the probabilistic-
validity. 
The above-mentioned connection cannot be shown in case of conditional 
sentences, and the truth-conditional validity lacks to be a proof for reasonableness. 
For example, considering the conditional inference ǲIf I eat those mushrooms, I will 
be poisonedǳ26. The simple fact to not eat the mushrooms makes the inference 
materially true, but it is really difficult to say whether the assertion is right or 
wrong, so that the decision connected to it would be the best or the worst in terms 
of practical interest. Indeed, if the mushrooms are not poisoned, but absolutely 
delicious porcinis, and I decide to not eat them, my choice would not be right. This 
                                                          
25 Ernest W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals. An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic, 88. 
26 Ernest W. Adams, The Logic of Conditionals. An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic, 89. 
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confirms Adamsǯ intuition, according to which the truth-conditional validity of a 
conditional inference does not prove its reasonableness--its probabilistic validity 
cannot be guaranteed by classical validity--so that the rule according to which 
probability equals probability of true lacks with conditional inferences. Why? The 
explanation, according to Adams, is that when we assert a conditional we do not 
express the probability it is true, but rather its conditional probability such as it is 
presented by Ramseyǯs Test. This approach should explain a lot of phenomena, like 
the mushroomsǯ example, in an easier way than standard probability does. This is 
the reason for which Adamsǯ Thesis is also known as Probability Conditional Thesis 
--(PCT): P(p ՜q) = P(q |p)--and its relation with the Material Conditional Thesis--
(MCT): p ՜q = p ⊃q = ~p שq --is fixed by the Conditional Deficit Formula (CDF)27: 
 �ሺ݌ ⊃ ݍሻ –  �ሺ݌ ՜ ݍሻ = [ͳ – �ሺ݌ ⊃ ݍሻ][ �ሺ~௣ሻ�ሺ௣ሻ  ]. 
Even though sometimes--when CDF is low--conditional probability can be 
inferred by material conditional, such a rule shows why generally they do not 
coincide at all28. 
The step from the idea that the probability of indicative conditionals is not the 
probability they are true--and so that P(p ՜q) ≠P(p ⊃q)--to the conclusion that 
they have neither truth-values nor, in general, truth conditions seems really 
obvious. However, I want to point out that Adams definitely denied any truth-values 
and conditions for indicative conditionals only in 1975, after knowing the problems 
raised by Lewisǯ Triviality Result. Of course, Adams proposed to analyze conditional 
inferences in term of probability since his first approach, but I think this is different 
from the totally denial of truth conditions. I am not completely sure he would have 
advanced such a ǲdrasticǳ solution if any Triviality Result would not have been 
                                                          
27 Ernest. W. Adams, ǲWhat Is at Stake in the Controversy over Conditionalǳ, in Conditionals, 
Information, and Inference, International Workshop, WCII 2002, Hagen, Germany, May 13-15 2002, 
eds. G. Kern-Isberner, W. Rödder, F. Kulmann (Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2005), 1--11. 
28 That these two kinds of probability do not coincide could be shown by a lot of example. One of 
these could be found in Ernest. W. Adams, ǲWhat Is at Stake in the Controversy over Conditionalǳ, 1--
2. 
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possible. Also because, even if supporting P(p ՜q) =P(p |q) we are refusing the 
truth conditions of material conditional, it simply means denying the ǲextremeǳ 
opinion according to which conditional inferences always have truth-values. 
Anyway, I will go back to Adamsǯ position--according to me, absolutely pragmatist--
after exposing the well-known Triviality Result and its consequences.  Although Adamsǯ logic works pretty well with indicative conditionals, his thesis 
presents some limits not really holding in natural language. For example, inferences like ǲIf it is sunny, then if it is my day off then I will go to the beachǳ--p ՜(q ՜z)--are 
excluded by Adams, but they may be asserted ordinarily, equalizing inferences like ǲIf it is sunny and it is my day off, then I will go to the beachǳ--(p רq) ՜ z--by the 
Law of Importation29. Also inferences joining a standard proposition and a 
conditional one, like ǲEither I will stay at home or if Jane calls me then I will go to the 
cinemaǳ--p ש(q ՜z)--are rejected by Adams, although they are really common in 
natural language. 
However, our language is full of complications to represent a real argument for 
rejecting a logic that seems to work well under a lot of aspects. Perhaps, also for this 
reason Adamsǯ hypothesis met several supporters. One of the most important is 
Dorothy Edgington, whose contribute helped to make Adamsǯ thesis one of the most 
shared in conditionalsǯ field. Her arguments support either the Equation either Adamsǯ conclusion that accepting P(p ՜q) =P(q |p) doubtless means to deny any 
truth conditions for conditional statements.  Her contribution made Adamsǯ 
hypothesis stronger in front of the Triviality Result, reason for what I prefer 
presenting Edgingtonǯs view after exposing such a result. But now let me keep on 
showing some other suppositional theories. 
 
                                                          
29 Law of Importation: [p ՜ (q ՜ z) ] ՜ [(p  ר q) ՜ z ]. Vann McGee presented an argument supporting the ejection of iterated conditionals, reporting that when we say ǲIf p, then if q then zǳ we 
are not accepting an iterated conditional, but rather a conditional with conjunctive antecedent, 
because what we have in mind is the conditional belief expressed by(p  ר q) ՜ z. See Vann McGee, ǲA 
Counterexample to Modus Ponensǳ, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 82, No. 9 (1985): 462--471. 
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3. Other suppositional theories: Mackie, Harper, Levi, Gärdenfors 
Via classical Bayesian conditionalization is not the only possible interpretation of Ramseyǯs Test. Indeed, some other philosophers read that famous paragraph of 
Ramsey 1929 in terms of non-probabilistic belief revision.  In this regard, 
Gärdenfors developed a semantically theory which found his precursors in Mackie 
and in those philosophers who elaborated Mackieǯs writing--like Harper and Levi.  
The general analysis offered by Mackie is based on the idea that saying ǲIf p, qǳ 
we are asserting q within the scope of the supposition that p. So, given that the 
primary function of ǲifǳ is to introduce a supposition, it could be translated with ǲsuppose thatǳ and it invites us to consider a possibility. Clearly, this kind of 
procedure cannot work with a material conditional, neither with any semantics of 
possible worlds--because the possibility Mackie has in mind ǲneeds to be explained 
in terms of concrete human procedures, and not the other way roundǳ30. Mackieǯs suppositional account treats conditional sentences not such as any 
essentially linguistic reasoning, but in terms of something that goes beyond any 
language grammatically structured.  According to him, in such a way we can explain 
every standard use of conditionals. Indeed, interpreting a conditional in terms of 
supposition we can either abandon the idea they are any strict sense statements--
simply true or simply false--either understand why sometimes they might assert the 
corresponding material conditional, sometimes a literally or concrete possible 
world, and go on.  
Now, since a supposition invokes a possible situation--while the truth, in a strict 
sense, belongs to actual descriptions--Mackie reject to say conditionals have, in their 
basic use, a truth-value31. Therefore he wrote: ǲThe general semantic structure of conditionals does not provide them with 
truth-values in all cases, but in some only; and this would be at least an awkward 
                                                          
30 John L. Mackie, Truth, Probability, and Paradox, 98. 
31 John L. Mackie, Truth, Probability, and Paradox, 105--106.  
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thing to accommodate in an attempt to display the whole structural semantics of a 
language in a truth-definition.ǳ32 
A suppositional account should help us to solve some problems with the logic of 
conditionals, like his application to counterfactuals. Indeed, Mackie said a 
supposition allows to introduce a different situation from the actual one, so that the 
conditional could be analyzed in the light of another possibility. This happens 
because we know the world is governed by causal laws able to produce various 
effects. Hence, Mackie suggested that: ǲCounterfactual conditionals are not to be taken literally as truth about possible 
worlds, but as a species of human procedure. They are just non-material 
conditionals plus a hint that their antecedents are unfulfilled, and non-material 
conditional merely express the asserting of something within the scope of some 
supposition—which may be done for any one of number of reasons which may 
themselves be reasonable or unreasonable.ǳ33 
Every argument is built from suppositions to conclusion, suppressing some 
premises--in quality of modified believes--in order to make the suppositions 
consistent.  
Certainly Mackieǯs proposal is not free from difficulties--like Edgington pointed 
out34--but, since his approach requires a notion of corrigibility of belief, it caught the 
attention of those philosophers interested in a suppositional account different from 
the probabilistic one presented by Adams. Particularly important is Harper and Leviǯs analysis of Mackieǯs papers, because they presented an account35 leading a 
                                                          
32 John L. Mackie, Truth, Probability, and Paradox, 108. 
33 John L. Mackie, Truth, Probability, and Paradox, 114--115. 
34 See a Review by Dorothy Edgington, ǲTruth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical 
Logic. by J. L. Mackieǳ, Mind, New Series, Vol. 85, No. 338 (1976): 303--308. 
35 For information about Harper and Leviǯs identities, see Zhiqiang Zhuang, Belief Change under the 
Horn Fragment of Propositional Logic (Doctoral dissertation, University of New South Wales, 2013), 
16--ͳ͹. Also see Oliver Schulte, ǲHow do the Harper and Levi Identities Constrain Belief Change?ǳ, 
inTruth and Probability, Essays in Honour of Hugh LeBlanc , eds. B. Brown and F. LePage, (London: 
College Publications at King College London, 2006), 123--137.  
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correlation between revision and contraction--two fundamental operators in Belief 
Revisionǯs field36. 
Either Harper either Leviǯs interpretation of Ramseyǯs Test is in terms of 
minimal revision, so that to accept a counterfactual conditional means that the 
minimal revision of knowledge to accept the antecedent requires the acceptance of 
the consequent too. Thus, they developed, independently, a system for representing 
rational belief change, allowing any revision of previously accepted evidences.  But, 
while Harper dealt with sentences as proposition, Levi treated them as objects of 
belief.37 
The contribution of these philosophers has been fundamental in Belief Revision, 
particularly in developing one of its most important model, known as ǲAGMǳ 
because of its three inventors, Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson. They 
advanced the idea that a belief state is a logically closed (under the rules of 
deductive logic) set of sentences, called belief set. In other word, saying that p 
belong to a belief state K means that p is a set member of K. A belief set designates 
the agentǯs view of the world, a static world which does not change. 38 It is such a 
view of the world--the agentǯs beliefs--that changes, because it is regularly subjected 
to new information. Hence, the belief set is exposed to an input, making that it will 
be revised and, consequently, creating a new belief set.  
AGM is studied in many areas of AI and represents a milestone in Belief Revision. 
Let me resume its postulates and its approach39: 
 
                                                          
36 See Sven Ove Hansson, "Logic of Belief Revision", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 
2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/logic-belief-revision/>. 
37 William L. Harper, ǲRational Conceptual Changeǳ, PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1976): 462--494. 
38 Zhiqiang Zhuang, Belief Change under the Horn Fragment of Propositional Logic, 10. 
39 For a first approach to AGM theory, I suggest Horacio Arló-Costa, Arthur. P. Pedersen, ǲBelief 
Revisionǳ, in Continuum Companion to Philosophical Logic, eds. L. Horsten and R. Pettigrew, 
(London: Continuum Press, 2011). 
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 Preliminaries and terminology: 
o Belief-representing sentences (lower-case letters like ǲpǳ, ǲqǳ, etc.): 
sentences representing beliefs in some propositional language--an AGM 
language formed by those sentences, elements of it. Actually, sentences 
do not capture every aspect of belief, but they are considered the best 
candidate for this purpose. The language contains usual truth-functional 
connectives and symbols like ⊥ and ⊤ denoting, respectively, an arbitrary 
contradiction and an arbitrary tautology. 
o Set of belief-representing sentences (capital letters like ǲAǳ, ǲBǳ, etc.): it 
represents the beliefs held by an agent. Sets closed under logically 
consequence--those sets in which every sentence following logically 
from this set is already in the set--are called Belief sets (indicated by ǲKǳ and ǲHǳ). In other words, a belief set is a propositional formula and its 
logical consequences.40  
o Consequence operator: a function Cn from sets of sentences to sets of 
sentences, satisfying the following conditions: 
 Inclusion: A كCn(A). 
 Monotonicity: If A كB, then Cn(A) كCn(B). 
 Iteration: Cn(A) =Cn(Cn(A)). 
o Some properties of Cn: 
 Supraclassicality: if a sentence p can be derived from a language A, 
which contains it, by classical truth-functional logic, then p א Cn(A). 
 Deduction: q א Cn(A ׫p) if and only if p ՜q א Cn(A). 
 Compactness: if p א Cn(A) then p א CnሺAǯሻ, where Aǯ is a finite subset 
of A. 
                                                          
40 Gärdenfors called a Belief set also ǲknowledge setǳ and he said that ǲ[…] it is a partial description of the world. ǲPartialǳ because in general there are sentences ф such that neither ф nor ¬ф are in Kǳ. 
Peter Gärdenfors, ǲBelief revision: an introductionǳ, in Belief Revision, ed. P. Gärdenfors (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 6. 
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If A =Cn(A) then A is logically closed with respect to Cn and, as usual, it 
is a belief set. 
 Epistemic attitudes (for a sentence p with respect to a belief set K):  
o Acceptance:  p is accepted if and only if p א K. In that case the agent 
believes p. 
o Rejection: p is rejected if and only if ~p א K. In that case the agent does 
not believe p. 
o Indetermination: p is undetermined if p ב K and ~p ב K. In that case the 
agent neither believes nor does not believes p. 
 Types of belief change (for a belief set K): 
o Expansion (+): a new belief-representing sentence p is simply added to K 
regardless of preserving consistency. Its result is defined as K +p = CnሺK׫ {p}). Expansion is the simplest AGM belief changeǯs operator and it 
satisfies this set of postulates: 
[K+1]. Closure: K +p is a belief set, i.e. it is closed under logical 
consequence. 
[K+2]. Success: p א K +p. 
[K+3]. Inclusion: K ك K +p. 
[K+4]. Vacuity: if p א K, then K +p =K, i.e. if p already belong to K, there is 
no expansion to do. 
[K+5]. Monotonicity: if K  كH, then K +p  كH +p, where H is a belief set 
including K. 
[K+6]. Minimality: K +p is the smallest belief set satisfying [K+1]—
[K+5]. Minimality can be considered as an expression of the 
principle of minimal change of belief, one of the main criterion of 
belief change in AGM. It consists in making the smallest possible 
change to receive the new information.41 
                                                          
41 ǲ[…] when we change our beliefs, we want to retain as much as possible from our old beliefs—we 
want to make a minimal change. Information is in general not gratuitous, and unnecessary losses of 
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o Revision ሺ∗ሻ: a new belief-representing sentence p is added to K 
preserving consistency. So, differently from expansion, revision should 
avoid inconsistency, eliminating that sentences which generate any 
contradiction with the new evidence. Therefore, revision is not an 
operation as simple as expansion and its result K ∗p is defined with this 
set of postulates: 
[K∗1]. Closure: K ∗p is a belief set. 
[K∗2]. Success: p א K ∗p. 
[K∗3]. Inclusion: K ∗p ك K +p. 
[K∗4]. Vacuity: if ~p ב K, then K +p كK ∗p, i.e. if ~p does not belong to K, 
there is no contradiction and no reason to remove anything. 
[K∗5]. Consistency: ⊥ א K ∗p if and only if ⊢~p, i.e. unless the new 
sentence is itself inconsistent, then the revised belief set is 
consistent.  
[K∗͸]. Extensionality: if p ≡q, then K ∗p =K ∗q, i.e. if two sentences are 
logically equivalent, their revision yields the same result. 
[K∗͹]. Superexpansion: K ∗(p רq) ك(K ∗p) +q, i.e. a revision by 
conjunction can be made first revising K with respect to p and then 
expanding K ∗p  by q, on condition that q does not contradict K ∗p. 
[K∗ͺ]. Subexpansion: if ~q ב K ∗p, then (K ∗p) +q ك K ∗(p ר q), i.e. for the 
same intuition captured by postulate [K∗͹], if q does not 
contradict the revised belief set, then the expansion of K ∗p by q is 
a subset of K ∗(p ר q). 
o Contraction ሺ∸ሻ: a belief-representing sentence p is eliminated from K, 
without adding any new belief. Usually this kind of operator works when 
either some doubt exists about a belief either the agent intends 
temporally to suspend its belief on a sentence. Contraction postulates are: 
                                                          
information are therefore to be avoided. This heuristic criterion may be called the criterion of informational economy.ǳ Peter Gärdenfors, ǲBelief revision: an introductionǳ, ͻ. 
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[K∸ͳ]. Closure: K ∗p is a belief set. [K∸ʹ]. Success: if ⊬p, then p ב K ∸p, i.e. the only sentences that cannot be 
contracted are the tautologies.  [K∸͵]. Inclusion: K ∸p ك K. [K∸Ͷ].Vacuity: if p בK, then K ∸p ك K, i.e. if p does not belong to K, 
contraction operator has to do nothing. 
[K∸ͷ]. Recovery: K  ك(K ∸p) +p, i.e. for recovering the original belief set 
it is enough to add the removed sentence by expansion. 
[K∸͸]. Extensionality: if p ≡q, then (K ∸p) =(K ∸q), i.e. if two sentences 
are logically equivalent, their contraction yields the same result. [K∸͹]. Conjunctive inclusion: If p בK ∸(p ר q), then K ∸(p ר q) ك K ∸p. [K∸ͺ]. Conjunctive overlap: (K ∸p) ת (K ∸q) ك K ∸(p רq), i.e. those 
beliefs preserved in (K ∸p) and(K ∸q) are also maintained in  
K ∸(p ר q). 
 Relation between revision and contraction: 
o Harper Identity: K ∸p =(K ∗~p) ת K, i.e. the result of eliminating p from K 
equals those beliefs that are retained after revising K by p. Harper 
Identity defines contraction in terms of revision, so that revision appears 
as a primitive operator. 
o Levi Identity: K ∗p =(K ∸~p) +p, i.e. a revision of K by p can be made first 
contracting K by ~p and then simply expanding it by p. In this way 
contraction is presented as a primitive operator and revision is defined in 
terms of it.    
Epistemic states associated with belief sets have been represented in several 
way. One of those is by Grove orderings, known for providing a semantic model for 
AGM theory, called sphere semantics 42-- inspired by Lewisǯ semantics for 
counterfactuals--and for making a representation for AGM.  
                                                          
42 Adam Grove, ǲTwo Modelling for Theory Changeǳ, Journal of Philosophical Logic, ͳ͹ ሺͳͻͺͺሻ: ͳͷ͹-
-170. 
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Gärdenfors developed an epistemic semantic model for conditionals based on 
AGM theory43, so interpreting conditionals sentences in terms of belief revision. 
The basic idea is that a sentence gets its meaning in correspondence, not with a 
world, but with a belief system. According to Gärdenfors, a belief system consists of: ǲሺͳሻ a class of models of epistemic states, ሺʹሻ a valuation function determining 
the epistemic attitude in the state for each epistemic state, (3) a class of epistemic 
inputs, and (4) an epistemic commitment function that for a given state of belief and a given epistemic input, determines a new state of belief.ǳ44  In this background the Ramseyǯs Test plays the crucial role of acceptability 
principle for sentences like ǲIf p then qǳ. So, Gärdenfors interpreted in a very 
naturally way that famous and tricky pass of Ramsey 1929 in terms of AGM revision, giving a suppositional interpretation of Ramseyǯs Test different from Adams: 
o Gärdenfors Ramsey Test (GRT): p ՜q א K  if and only if q א K ∗p, i.e. a 
conditional is accepted if and only if its consequent is contained into the 
belief set revised by the antecedent. 
Unfortunately, Gärdenfors proved that GRT is not compatible with those AGMǯs 
postulates which equalize the classic preservation condition--[K∗Ͷ] and [K∗ͺ]--and 
that it works just on pain of making AGM trivial.45 So, Gärdenfors himself 
interpreted his result as a defeat of AGM account for conditionals.  
In front of one more triviality result--also known as ǲGärdenforsǯ Triviality 
Resultǳ--several solution to avoid it have been advanced, included the ǲextremeǳ 
position to definitely reject the Ramseyǯs Test as acceptability criterion for 
conditionals.46 However, other alternatives, for example that one proposed by Levi--
                                                          
43 Peter Gärdenfors, Knowledge in flux, modeling the dynamics of epistemic states, (Cambridge MA: 
MIT Press, 1988). 
44 Horacio Arló Costa, Isaac Levi, ǲTwo Notions of Epistemic Validityǳ, Synthese, vol. ͳͲͻ ሺͳͻͻ͸ሻ, 
222. 
45 Peter Gärdenfors, Sten Lindström, Michael Morreau, Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz, ǲThe negative 
Ramsey test: Another triviality resultǳ, The Logic of Theory Change, Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science, Vol. 465 (1991): 127--134. 
46 Hans Rott, ǲIfs, though and becauseǳ, Erkenntnis, vol. 25 (1986): 345--370. 
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also shared by Arló Costa47--demonstrated that Gärdenforsǯ result could not be 
avoid simply denying the Ramsey Test.48  
Levi accepted the Ramsey Test as acceptability principle for conditionals, but 
rejecting the idea that belief sets includes such conditional sentences as elements of 
it. He says: ǲ[…] a conditional of the (regimented) type h > g is a judgment concerning the 
serious possibility of g relative to a transformation of the current corpus or belief 
set K expressible in L and not relative to the current corpus itself. The 
transformation T(K) of K is the L-minimal revision of K which is subject to the sole constraint that h be a member of TሺKሻ. […] Consequently, conditional sentences 
ought not to be construed as truth-value-bearing any more than judgments of 
serious possibility ought to be. They are expressions of our evaluations of truth-
value-bearing hypotheses with respect to serious possibility relative to 
transformations of the current corpus (Levi 1977, 1980).ǳ49 
Interpreting conditional sentences as serious possibilities about a belief set--not 
as members of the belief set itself--Levi makes that the preservation condition 
cannot affect them. According to him this is the only manner to avoid a trivialization, 
given that every revision postulates is restricted to a propositional belief set and to 
its elements. So, he considers GRT such as no the most appropriate formula for 
translating Ramseyǯs idea, because now we need a notion able to represent a 
principle of  acceptability for sentences holding a cognitive content but lacking 
truth-values. Therefore, Levi proposed such a reformulation of GRT: 
o Levi Ramsey Test (LRT): if p, q א L0 then p ՜q א s(K) if and only if              
q א K ∗p, whenever K is consistent--where L0 is a Boolean language free of 
                                                          
47 Horacio Arló Costa, Isaac Levi, ǲTwo Notions of Epistemic Validityǳ, ʹͳ͹--262. 
48 Isaac Levi, ǲIteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Testǳ, Synthese, vol. ͹͸ ሺͳͻͺͺሻ: Ͷͻ--81. Also 
Arlo-Costa shared the same position, see Horacio Arló Costa, Isaac Levi, ǲTwo Notions of Epistemic Validityǳ, Synthese, vol. ͳͲͻ ሺͳͻͻ͸ሻ, ʹͳ͹--262. 
49 Isaac Levi, ǲIteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Testǳ, ͸ͳ--62. 
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modal and epistemic operator and s(K) is a ǲsupport setǳ closed under 
logical consequences such that s(K) ل K. 50 
Honestly, I find Leviǯs argument really interesting because, excluding conditional 
sentences from the belief set and speaking about them not in terms of truth but in 
terms of acceptability conditions, he takes a position à la Adams but in a belief 
revision background. His hard judgment against keeping on trying to conciliate 
Ramsey Test with a possible world semantics captured my attention too. He 
established that the origin of misunderstanding conditional sentences resides again 
in such attempt to analyze Stalnaker and Lewisǯ view in terms of Ramsey test for 
conditionalsǯ acceptability--even if, now, by a belief-revision account: ǲThe moral of the story would seem to be that efforts to reconstruct a theory of 
conditionals along the lines of Stalnaker and Lewis in terms of belief revisions ought 
to be abandoned. Such theories cannot be reconstructed along such lines. If they 
make sense at all, they make sense within a framework which takes realism about 
possible worlds seriously. I for one cannot find it in my heart to embrace such 
metaphysics gratuitously. Gärdenfors exhibits a similar penchant but, at the same 
time, displays a devotion to the Stalnaker-Lewis ideas. The need to accommodate 
Stalnaker-Lewis is so great that he seems prepared to give up the core of the belief 
revision approach - to wit, that bodies of knowledge define the spaces of serious 
possibility.ǳ51 However, also Leviǯs account presents several problems, like those ones usually 
connected with denying that conditionals are true or false. In add, even his criticism 
of Gärdenforsǯ truth semantics does not seem to work really. Indeed, although the 
problems of Gärdenforsǯ account are unquestionable, it definitely appears to survive 
to Leviǯs criticism. 52 On the other hand, we should admit that Leviǯs arguments 
deserve the merit to have induced us to pay more attention to AGMǯs formalism.  
                                                          
50 Horacio Arló Costa, Isaac Levi, ǲTwo Notions of Epistemic Validityǳ, ʹʹͷ--226. 
51 Isaac Levi, ǲIteration of Conditionals and the Ramsey Testǳ, ͸ͻ. 
52 About this point, see Roger. D. Rosenkrantz, ǲReview: For the Sake of the Argument. Ramsey Test Conditionals, Inductive Inference, and Nonmonotic Reasoning by Isaac Leviǳ, The Journal of Symbolic 
Logic, vol. 62, No. 3 (1997): 1041--1043.  
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In conclusion, in a belief revisionǯs context both the attempt to conciliate Ramsey 
Test with the semantics of possible worlds and the extreme position to deny truth 
conditions for conditionals preserve many troubles.  
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II 
STALNAKERǯS ANALYSIS  
 
1. A semantic for conditional statements 
It is now the moment to talk about the great contribute provided by Robert 
Stalnaker--in collaboration with Richmond Thomason--so that any reader can easily 
understand why several philosophers holding a suppositional account for 
conditionals, like Gärdenfors et al., really wished to conciliate their view with Stalnakerǯs non-truth-functional account.  
When Stalnaker developed his theory, in 1968, he had in mind a semantics able 
to provide truth conditions for conditionals--first for counterfactuals but then 
extending it to indicatives too53--in accordance with Ramsey-Adams Thesis. Indeed, 
in front of quite unsatisfactory theories--like the material implication analysis --
Stalnaker thought to consider Ramseyǯs Test, even though making some 
adjustments--or at least trying to generalize it, given that Ramsey spoke only about situations where the agent has no idea about the antecedentǯs truth-value. So, 
according to Stalnaker, this is the procedure for deciding whether (or not) believe to 
a conditional statement: ǲFirst, add the antecedent ሺhypotheticallyሻ to your stock of beliefs; second, make 
whatever adjustment are required to maintain consistency (without modifying the 
hypothetical belief in the antecedent); finally, consider whether or not the consequent is then true.ǳ54 
                                                          
53 ǲThe analysis was constructed primarily to account for counterfactual conditionals – 
conditionals whose antecedents are assumed by the speaker to be false – but the analysis was 
intended to fit conditional sentences generally, without regard to the attitudes taken by the speaker 
to antecedent or consequent or his purpose in uttering them, and without regard to grammatical mood in which the conditional is expressed.ǳ Robert C. Stalnaker (1976), ǲIndicative conditionalsǳ, in 
Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce 
(Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 198. 
54 Robert C. Stalnaker (1968), ǲA Theory of Conditionalsǳ, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, 
Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1981), 41--55. 
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Once established belief-conditions for conditionals, how to fix truth-conditions? 
In this regard Stalnaker introduced the concept of possible world, which represents 
the ǲontological analogue of a stock of hypothetical beliefsǳ55, so that conditionalsǯ 
truth-conditions for conditionals can be provided by an adaptation of truth-
conditions settled by the possible world semantics: ǲConsider a possible world in which A is true, and which otherwise differs 
minimally from the actual world. ǲIf A, then Bǳ is true ሺfalseሻ just in case B is true 
(false) in that possible world.ǳ56 
Applying for an analysis in terms of possible worlds, Stalnaker built a semantical 
system (C2) for conditionals using Kripkeǯs semantics for modal logic:57 
 Formal system: 
o Conditional formulas: every expressions of the form ǲp >qǳ. If p and q are 
well-formed formulas (wff), then also p >q is a wff. Other kinds of connectives ሺר, ש, ~, ≡, ⊃ሻ are defined as usual. Biconditional connective ሺ≷ሻ can be defined as:  
 p ≷q = (p >q) ר(q > p). 
o Modal formulas: every expression like ǲ□pǳ and ǲ◊pǳ, defined as: 
 □p =~p >p. 
 ◊p =~(p >~p). 
o Rules of inference:  
 Modus Ponens: p >q, p ⊢q, i.e. if p and p >q are theorems, then q is a 
theorem. 
 Modus Tollens: p >q, ~p ⊢~q, i.e. if ~p and p >q are theorems, then 
~q is a theorem. 
                                                          
55 Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲA Theory of Conditionalsǳ, Ͷͷ. 
56 Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲA Theory of Conditionalsǳ, Ͷͷ. 
57 The whole system could be found in Robert C. Stalnaker and Richmond H. Thomason, ǲA 
semantic analysis of conditional logicǳ, Theoria, vol. 36 (1970): 23--Ͷʹ, and in Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲA Theory of Conditionalsǳ, Ͷͳ--55. 
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 Gödel rule of necessitation: if p is a theorem, then also □p is a 
theorem. 
o Axioms: 
[A1]. Any tautologous wff is an axiom. [Aʹ]. □(p ⊃q) ⊃( □p ⊃□q). [A͵]. □(p ⊃q) ⊃(p >q). [AͶ]. ◊p ⊃[(p >q) ⊃~(p >~q)]. 
[A5]. p >(q שz) ⊃[(p >q) ש(p >z)]. 
[A6]. (p >q) ⊃(p ⊃q). 
[A7]. p ≷q ⊃[(p >z) ⊃(q >z)]. 
Axioms [A3] and [A͸] make ǲ>ǳ a kind of intermediate connective 
between strict implication and material conditional, despite keeping 
some difference with respect to the other ones. Indeed, the following 
properties--valid for strict implication or material conditional or for both 
--do not hold in C2:58  
 False antecedent: ~p ⊢p >q. 
 True consequent: q ⊢p >q. 
 Material negation: ~(p >q) ⊢p. 
 Simplification of disjunctive antecedents: (p שq) >z ⊢(p >z) ר(q >z). 
 Antecedent preservation: ⊢p >(q >p). 
 Import-Export: p ՜(q ՜z) ⊢(p רq) ՜z. 
 Transitivity: p >q, q >z ⊢p >z--ǲ>ǳ cannot be iterated. 
 Contraposition: p >q ⊢~q >~p. 
 Antecedent Strengthening: p >q  ⊢(p רz) >q. 
 ~(p >q) ≡(p >~q), given ◊p. 
 Semantics: 
o Model structure (M): a triple structure ۃK, R, λۄ. K represents the set of 
possible world. R is the relation of relative possibility (or relation of 
                                                          
58 William B. Starr, ǲIndicative Conditionals, Strictlyǳ, Cornell University (2014): 9--10. 
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accessibility) defining the model structure. In other words, R is the 
relation between worlds and wRwǯ means ǲw is possible with respect to wǯ ǯǳ. λ is the only element of M not concerning Kripkeǯs semantics and it 
represents the absurd world--a world of K in which all formulas, even 
contradictions and their consequences, are true. Stalnaker introduced it 
for interpreting those conditionals whose antecedent is impossible. 
o Selection-function (f): a function taking a proposition and a possible 
world as its arguments and a possible world as its value. So, given a 
selection-function f(p, w) =wǯ, p is the antecedent of a conditional, w is 
the base world, and wǯ is the selected world. These are the conditions that 
a selection-function has to observe: 
 For all antecedent p and every base world w, p must be true in  
f(p, w), i.e. the antecedent must be true in the selected world, so that wǯ is also called p-world. 
 For all antecedent p and every base world w, f(p, w) = λ when it is not 
possible any world with respect to w where p is true, i.e. the selection-
function is an absurd world just when the antecedent is impossible, so 
that there are no p-worlds. 
 f(p, w) has to select the closest p-world to w, i.e. the selection-function 
must take, if possible, the most similar possible world to the base 
world. 
 For all antecedent p and every base world w, if p is true in w, then  
f(p, w) =w, i.e. if the base world w is a world in which the antecedent 
is true, then it will be selected. 
 For all antecedent p and pǯ and every base world w, if p is true in  
f(pǯ, w) and pǯ is true in f(p, w), then f(p, w) =f(pǯ, w). 
o Semantical rules for p >q : 
 p >q is true in w if q is true in f(p, w), i.e. a conditional turns out to be 
true in the base world when its consequent is true in the selected 
world. 
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 p >q is false in w if q is false in f(p, w), i.e. a conditional is false in the 
base world when its consequent is false in the selected world. 
o Limit assumption: for all antecedent p and every base world w there is at 
least one p-world--a world where p is true--different from w. 
o Uniqueness assumption: for all antecedent p and every base world w 
there is just one closest p-world, i.e. there never are two equally 
accessible worlds to w where p is true.  
o Conditional excluded middle (CEM): (p >q) ש(p >~q). 
 Pragmatic restrictions (at least for indicative conditionals):  
o If w אC, then f(p, w) א C, i.e. for every world w in the context set C, the 
closest p-world must, pertain, if possible, to the same context set too. A 
context set is the set of worlds epistemically possible for the agent. In 
other words, since a lot of possibilities are usually taken for granted in a 
conversion, a context set is that set of worlds compatible with those 
possibilities. Stalnaker specified that a selection-function cannot be 
defined in terms of C. However, a context set can help in ordering possible 
worlds: every world in C is closer to w than any other one outside it. 
Mentioning pragmatic restrictions, Stalnaker held a strict relation between 
semantic and pragmatic--nowadays no longer questioned--, claiming that the 
ambiguity of a conditional statement does not pertain to the semantic level, but to 
the pragmatic one. In other words, a conditional is not semantically ambiguous, but 
just pragmatically. Though their pragmatical ambiguity, conditionals own a common 
structure which gives them a single meaning and reveals their truth conditions. That 
common structure is given just by a semantics for conditional logic. 
Invoking the link between semantic and pragmatic, Stalnaker tried also to 
explain the problem related with the direct argument--p שq ⊢~p >q.59 Indeed, such 
a schema is invalid for Stalnakerǯs account because if we admit the validity of the 
                                                          
59 Robert C. Stalnaker (1976), ǲIndicative conditionalsǳ, 193--194. 
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direct argument then ǲ>ǳ is logically equivalent with the material conditional ǲ⊃ǳ, 
and we should also accept several absurd inferences. For example, let us consider 
the following direct argument: [ͳ] ǲEither the butler or the gardener did it. Therefore, if the butler didnǯt do it, the gardener didǳ.  
The validity of [1] makes ǲ>ǳ logically equivalent to the material conditional, so 
we should also assume any paradoxical cases related to ǲ⊃ǳ, like this: 
[2] ǲThe butler did it. Therefore, if the butler didnǯt do it, the gardener didǳ. 
But, while [1] seems intuitively valid, [2] does not at all. On the other hand, both 
sentences have the same conclusion, and the premise of [2] entails the premise of 
[1]. Consequently, considering semantically valid the direct argument we are 
assuming ǲ⊃ǳ such as indicative conditional. And, rejecting the ⊃-analysis, we have 
to reject the direct argument too.  
Now, Stalnakerǯs solution consists in considering semantically invalid both [1] 
and [2], because the premise of [1] does not semantically entail its conclusion. 
Assuming the validity of the direct argument represents a mistake due to those rules 
holding in every conversation. Hence, Stalnaker suggested--like Grice did, but with 
different purpose--to look, not only at the semantic content of a sentence, but also at 
the pragmatic principles governing any discourse. 
 
2. Stalnakerǯs probability system 
A defense of Stalnakerǯs theory is given by drawing a connection between his 
semantics and the theory of conditional probability--that in those years was getting 
well received. So, Stalnaker built a probability system C2 by three steps, and each 
step represents a probability system, extension of the previous one:60 
                                                          
60 That argument could be found in Robert C. Stalnaker ሺͳͻ͹Ͳሻ, ǲProbability and conditionalsǳ, in 
Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce 
(Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 107--128. 
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 First system (P1): it combines a truth valuation function v and an absolute 
probability function Pr compatible each other, showing that they are not 
exclusive alternatives, but complementary ones.  
o P1-interpretation: an order ۃv, Pr ۄ where, for every proposition p, if 
Pr(p)=1, then v(p)=1. P1 represents a possible world and the state of 
knowledge an agent has in that world.  
o Truth valuation function (v ): any function v, whose value is into {1; 0}, 
representing a possible world. Given two propositions p and q, v has to 
meet these conditions: 
 v(p)=1 if p is true in the world represented by the truth valuation 
function, otherwise v(p)=0. 
 v(~p) = ͳ−v(p). 
 v(p ר q) = vሺpሻ ∙ vሺqሻ 
o Absolute probability function (Pr): any function Pr representing a state of 
knowledge. It assigns value 1 for those propositions known to be true, 
and value 0 for those ones known to be false. In addition, it includes a 
measure between {1; 0} for the degree to which an agent has right to 
believe propositions known neither to be true nor to be false. Given two 
proposition p and q, these are the conditions Pr has to meet: 
 ͳ ൒ Pr(p) ൒ 0. 
 Pr(p) = Pr(p ר p). 
 Pr(p ר q) = Pr(q ר p). 
 Pr(p ר (q ר z)) = Pr((q ר p) ר z). 
 Pr(p) + Pr(~p) = 1. 
 Pr(p) = Pr(p רq) +Pr(p ר~q). 
Pr(p) could be interpreted in terms of bet, where Pr  is a number r  
determining the minimum odds an agent would be willing to accept in a 
bet on the truth of p. Given r, the agent should be willing to bet on p at 
odds no less favorable than r/(r −ͳ), i.e. the bet should not be less than 
the ratio between the probability the proposition is true (= the bet is 
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won) and the probability it is false (= the bet is lost). If there is no set of 
bets such that the agent is sure to loose, then the Pr is coherent. In 
addition, a coherent probability function is called strictly coherent when 
there is no set of bets such that the agent might loose and cannot possibly 
win. 
o Class of epistemically possible worlds (K ): given a state of knowledge Pr, 
K is a class of possible worlds compatible with Pr, defined as: 
 K ={v/ۃv, Prۄ is a P1-interpretation}.  
If Pr(p) =1 then p is true in K, i.e. it is true in every possible epistemic 
world. In that case P1 is strictly coherent. So, the requirement a coherent 
Pr has to meet to be strictly coherent is: 
 If Pr(p)=1 then p is true in all possible outcomes.61 
o Conditional probability (Pr(q, p) ): it represents reasonable odds for a 
conditional bet.62 Given two events p and q, where their conditional 
probability is a number r, the agent should be willing to bet that q on the 
condition p at odds of r/(r −ͳ). So, it is appropriate to interpret Pr(q , p) 
in terms of absolute probability: 
  �ݎሺݍ, ݌ሻ =  �௥ሺ௣˄௤ሻ �௥ሺ௣ሻ  , where Pr(p)≠Ͳ.  
When Pr(p)=0, Pr(q, p) is undefined. 
A Conditional probability is just a ratio between two absolute 
probabilities. However, because [P1] does not cover counterfactual 
probabilities, an extension of that is needed. 
 Second system (P2): as extension of P1, it combines a truth valuation 
function v and a probability function Pr as well. But in this second system Pr 
                                                          
61 Also known as ǲKemenyǯs conditionǳ because presented by Kemeny in: John G. Kemeny, ǲFair bets and inductive probabilitiesǳ, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 20 (1955): 263--273. It should 
be pointed out that this condition is not generally satisfied whether the set of possible outcomes is an infinite set. But, of course, that is not a case of Stalnakerǯs analysis. 
62 See note 18. 
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is a conditional probability function--which is not primitive, but easily 
defined as Pr(p) =Pr(p, T), that is a special case of conditional probability. 
o P2-interpretation: an order ۃv, Pr ۄ where, for every proposition p and q, 
if Pr(q, p) =1, then v(p ⊃ q) = 1.   
o  Extended probability function: any conditional probability function 
meeting these conditions: 
 Pr(q, p) ൒ 0. 
 Pr(q, q) = 1. 
 If Pr(q, p) = Pr(p, q) = 1, then Pr(z, q) = Pr(z, p). 
 Pr(q ר p, z) = Pr(p ר q, z). 
 Pr(q ר p, z) = Pr(q, z) ∙ Pr(p, q ר z). 
 If Pr(~z, z) ≠ 1, then Pr(~p, z) =ͳ−Pr(q, z). 
An extended probability function represents not only an extended state of 
knowledge, but also a set of hypothetical state of knowledge, since it 
measures the degree to which an agent has a right to believe a 
proposition q but also to which it would have a right to believe q if he 
knew some condition p--but that instead it does not know. By the way, if 
the condition is known to be true then Pr(p, T) =1, so that Pr(q, p) = 
Pr(q, T). When q is a tautology, conditional knowledge is a tout court 
knowledge. 
o Impossible proposition: a proposition whose negation is known to be 
true, i.e. when Pr(p, ~p) =1.  
o Absurd state of knowledge: a state of knowledge assuming an impossible 
proposition as true. 
o Extended belief function: any conditional probability function that is an 
extended probability function too. 
 Third system (P3): extension of P2 by introducing conditional propositions 
and making a change in the object language. His system represents the whole 
C2 system. 
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o C2 Object language: it is the same previously language, with the exception that the connective ǲ>ǳ is now a primitive symbol and, if p and q are wffs, 
then also p >q is a wffs. 
o C2 extended probability function: a function meeting all of the conditions 
of an ordinary extended probability function. 
o Absolute probability of a conditional proposition (Pr(p >q)): it must be 
equal to the conditional probability of the consequent q on the condition 
of the antecedent p : 
 Pr(p >q) = Pr(q, p). 
o Probabilistic simultaneously satisfaction: a class of proposition is  
p-simultaneously satisfiable when every member might be known to be 
true. 
o Probabilistic validity: a wff is p-valid if its negation is not  
p-simultaneously satisfiable, i.e. whose negation cannot be known to be 
true. 
o Definitions of modal operators: 
 □p =~p >p. 
 ◊p = ~ □~p. 
o C2 Rules: 
 If p ⊃q and p are theorems, then q is a theorem. 
 If p is a theorem, then □p is a theorem. 
o C2 Axioms:  
 Any tautologous wff is an axiom. 
 □(p ⊃q) ⊃( □p ⊃ □q). 
 □(p ⊃q) ⊃( p >q). 
 ◊p ⊃[(p >q) ⊃~(p ⊃~q)]. 
 [p >(q  ש z)] ⊃[(p >q) ש(p >z)]. 
 (p >q) ⊃(p ⊃q). 
 {[(p >q) ר(q >p)] ⊃(p >z)} ⊃(q >z). 
o Object language theorems: 
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 ⊢ (T  >p) ≡ p. 
 ⊢ p >p. 
 ⊢ ◊z  ⊃[(z >p) ≡~(z >~p)]. 
 ⊢ z  >(p ר q) ≡[z >(q ר p)]. 
 ⊢ z  >(p ר q) ≡ {[(z >p) ר[(p ר z) > q]}. 
o Semantical completeness theorem: a class of wffs of C2 is  
p-simultaneously satisfiable iff it is C2-consistent. 
o Derived rules and theorems:  
 If ⊢p, then ⊢z1 >[z2 >…>(zn >p)]. 
 If ⊢p ⊃q, then ⊢ (z >p) ⊃(z >q). 
 ⊢z >(p ≡q) ≡[(z >p) ≡(p >q)]. 
 ⊢z >(p ר q) ≡(z >p) ר(z >q). 
In conclusion, Stalnaker developed a parallelism between his semantics and the 
theory of conditional probability, showing that the theorems of C2 are nevertheless the valid sentences of Ramseyǯs Test. 
 
3. Lewis revision of Stalnakerǯs account It is well known that Stalnakerǯs theory of conditionals is really close to David Lewisǯ analysis, so that we may easily find several texts speaking about Stalnaker-Lewisǯ approach. In spite of that, their accounts conserves some differences, other 
than the fact that Lewisǯ theory interests only counterfactual conditionals--symbolized by ǲ□՜ǳ. 
First of all, Lewis rejected the Uniqueness assumption considering it unjustified. 
He simply showed how hard is choosing one closest p-world, leading to think that 
there might be more equally closest p-worlds.63 Consequently, Lewis rejected the 
                                                          
63 ǲExample: A is ǮBizet and Verdi are compatriotsǯ, F is ǮBizet and Verdi are Frenchǯ, I is ǮBizet and Verdi are Italianǯ. Grant for the sake of the argument that we have the closest F-world and the closest 
I-world; that these are distinct (dual citizenships would be a gratuitous difference from actuality); 
and that these are the two finalists in the competition for closest A-worldǯǯ. David Lewis, ǲCounterfactual and comparative Possibilityǳ, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, 
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law of Conditional Excluded Middle because, if we do not assume the Uniqueness 
assumption--simply thinking that there might be more equally closest p-worlds--, 
why should we accept CEM? Even assuming it works, it would allow us to choose 
just one single world. In addition, it really does not work! Indeed, although the 
objection could seem prima facie inconsistent--according to any ordinary language--
there could be found several counterexamples showing CEM does not work.64 So, 
even though it could be plausible in support of the thesis ~(p □՜q) ≡ p □՜~q, it 
could not be considered at all such as a general criterion for similarity between 
worlds in which the antecedent p is true.  
Another objection Lewis raised against Stalnakerǯs theory is that it loses the difference between ǲwouldǳ and ǲmightǳ. Indeed, Lewis proposed a definition of 
might-conditional in terms of would-conditional, so that a might-conditional ǲ◊՜ǳ is 
defined in such a way: p ◊՜q = ~(p □՜~q)--where p ◊՜q represents p □՜◊q. Lewisǯ definition, together with CEM, implies that there is no difference in truth-values between ǲwouldǳ and ǲmightǳ, causing that p ◊՜q implies p □՜q and vice 
versa  in both Stalnaker and Lewisǯ accounts--except in vacuous cases. But ǲthis is obviously an inacceptable conclusionǳ for Stalnaker, as himself admitted65, reason 
for what he could not define a might conditional such as Lewis did. On the other 
hand, Lewis pointed out that he could not find other manner to define ǲmightǳ according to Stalnakerǯs account: ǲHow else could he define it? Four candidates come to mind: ◊ሺϕ & ɗ),  ◊ሺϕ □՜ɗ), ϕ □՜◊ɗ), and ϕ □՜◊ሺϕ &ɗ). But none will do. Take ϕ as ǮI looked in my pocketǯ and ɗ as ǮI found a pennyǯ; suppose I didnǯt look, suppose there was no 
                                                          
eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel Publishing Company, 
1981), 60. 
64 The most common counterexample is: ǲIt is not that case that if Bizet and Verdi were 
compatriots, Bizet would be Italian; and it is not the case that if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, 
Bizet would not be Italian; nevertheless, if Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet either would or would not be Italian.ǳ David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 80. 
65 Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲA Defense of Conditional Excluded Middleǳ, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, 
Decision, Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1981), 98. 
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penny to be found, and make commonplace assumptions about relevant matters of 
fact. Then ǮIf I looked, I might have found a pennyǯ is plainly false, but all four 
candidate symbolization are true. ϕ &ɗ is false, but only contingently so; hence  ◊ሺϕ &ɗ) is true. ϕ □՜ɗ is false, but again only contingently so; hence ◊ሺϕ □՜ɗ) is 
true. If I had looked, ɗ and (ϕ &ɗ) would have been false, but again only 
contingently so; hence ϕ □՜◊ɗ and ϕ □՜◊ሺϕ &ɗሻ are true. […]ǳ66 
Lewis disapproves also the Limit assumption because, even not assuming exactly 
one closest p-world, it seems to suggest proceeding to closer and closer p-worlds 
until get to an end. The Limit assumption completely excludes the possibility to 
proceed infinitely, and this is, once again, unjustified67.    
In conclusion, Lewis proposed such a revision of Stalnakerǯs theory: to select a 
set of possible p-worlds that will equal the original Stalnakerǯs selection-function in 
case the set contains a single world, but it will not if, and it isnǯt out of the question, 
the set contains more--finitely or infinitely--p-worlds. So, a counterfactual p □՜q is 
true in the actual world if and only if some accessible p-world in which q is true is 
closer to the actual one than any p-world in which q is false. In the same way, p ◊՜q 
is true in the actual world if and only if there are accessible p-worlds and, for every 
accessible p-world in which q is false, there is some p-world in which q is true that is 
at least as close to the actual world as it is. Now, in such a revision of Stalnakerǯs 
account we need assumptions other than those of Uniqueness and Limit. According 
to Lewis we should assume:68 
                                                          
66 David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 80--81. 
67 “Example: A is ǮI am over ͹ feet tallǯ. If there are closest A-worlds to ours, pick one of them: how tall am I there? I must be ͹+ε feet tall, for some positive ε, else it would not be an A-world. But there 
are A-worlds where I am only ͹+ε/ʹ feet tall. Since that is closest to my actual height, why isnǯt one 
of these worlds closer to ours than the purportedly closest A-worlds where I am only ͹+ε feet tall? And why isnǯt a suitable world where I am only ͹+ε/Ͷ feet even closer to ours, and so ad infinitum? 
(In special cases, but not in general, there may be a good reason why not. Perhaps ͹+ε could have 
been produced by a difference in one gene, whereas any height below that but still above 7 would 
have taken differences in many genes). If here are A-worlds closer and closer to i without end, then 
any consequent you like holds at every closest A-world to i, because there arenǯt any. If I were over ͹ feet tall I would bump my head on the skyǳ. David Lewis, ǲCounterfactual and comparative Possibilityǳ, ͸͵. 
68 David Lewis, ǲCounterfactual and comparative Possibilityǳ, ͸͵--64. 
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o An Ordering assumption: for every world w, a similarity relation 
produces a weak ordering of those worlds accessible to w, such that wǯ⩽wwǯǯ means ǲwǯǯ is not closer to w than wǯ ǳ--where ⩽w is connected 
and transitive.  
o A Centering assumption: every world is accessible and closer to itself 
than any other world. 
I want to point out that Lewis, like Stalnaker, thought the closeness between 
worlds in terms of similarity.69 But he tried, according to me, to give us a little more 
sophisticated definition70, identifying the similarity order in relation to the natural laws governing every world. So, the ǲbest systemǳ is that set of worlds totally equal 
to the actual one with reference to the natural laws, but with the only difference that a small ǲmiracleǳ, happened in a time t, made the antecedent true. Consequently, any 
particular fact before t is preserved, but some other facts after t are not.71 
However, Lewisǯ revision of Stalnakerǯs theory does not solve completely those 
problems which it was previously designed for. Indeed, Stalnaker replied72 that, first 
of all, a reformulation of his own theory in terms of ⩽w represents just a special case of Lewisǯ account and, second, the assumptions of Uniqueness and Limit are not so 
simple to avoid because they denote an entailment principle in the semantics for 
conditionals. On the other hand, Stalnaker admitted that many assumptions made in 
an abstract semantic theory are not so well defined at the moment of their 
                                                          
69 Actually, in a personal conversation Stalnaker told me that he never gave a definition of ǲsimilarityǳ. According to him, it is Lewis who talked explicitly about such a notion. Stalnaker limited 
to say that the world which differs minimally from the actual one is the most similar. However, although he did not logically define such a ǲsimilarityǳ, this notion is certainly invoked. Therefore, even if I understand that ǲsimilarityǳ is an elusive concept,  I think it is not an advantage--but rather a 
limit--to not have given a properly definition. 
70 However he cannot solve every problem that a so much ambiguous notion, like that of similarity, 
yield. 
71 David Lewis, Counterfactuals, 72--77.  
72 Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲA Defense of Conditional Excluded Middleǳ, in Ifs: Conditionals, Belief, 
Decision, Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (Dordrecht & Boston: Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1981), 87--104. 
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application. Reason for what he proposed a general criterion of vagueness, 
identified with the Theory of Supervaluations developed by Van Fraassen73. 
A supervaluation consists in a two-stage valuation, after that both standard 
three-valued and two-valued valuation are defined. In the first stage, every formula ϕ is evaluated by a three-valued valuation. In the second stage, supervaluations are 
associated to the valuations, so that every ϕ is supervaluated. Given a two-valued 
valuation v2, a three-valued valuation v3 and a supervaluation s, s is so defined, for 
every ϕ: 
 s(ϕ)=t iff v2(ϕ)=v3(ϕ)=t. 
 s(ϕ)=f iff v2(ϕ)=v3(ϕ)=f. 
 s(ϕ)=n iff v2(ϕ)≠v3(ϕ). 
In other words, for every formula ϕ, if every two-valued valuation coincides with 
every three-valued valuation about the truth-value assignment, then a 
supervaluation is associated to them, such that v2(ϕ) =v3(ϕ) =s(ϕ). So, basically, 
Van Fraassen proposed a partial semantic isomorphic to the truth-functional 
semantics of Kleeneǯs three-valued logic74, according to which every partially 
defined semantic interpretation--assigning truth-values by a two-value classical 
valuation--will be completed arbitrarily by the correspondent class of completed 
defined interpretations. Hence, a supervaluation determines that if and only if a 
sentence is true in all corresponding classical valuations then it is true and if and 
only if the sentence is false in all of them then it is false. But, when it is true in some 
classical valuations and false in other ones, the sentence is neither true nor false, i.e. 
it is a truth-gap.  
                                                          
73 Bas Van Fraassen, ǲSingular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logicǳ, Journal of Philosophy 68 
(1966): 481--Ͷͻͷ, and Bas Van Fraassen, ǲHidden Variables in Conditional Logicǳ, Theoria, vol. 40 
(1974): 176--190. 
74 Stephen C. Kleene, ǲOn notation for ordinal numbersǳ, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 3, No. 4 
(1938): 150--155. Kleeneǯs three-valued logic is basically the same proposed by de Finetti (1935), but without mentioning the connective ǲ∣ǳ.  
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Recurring to Van Fraassenǯs theory, Stalnaker provided an argument in support 
of CEM showing that, because of the vagueness, there might be cases in which 
neither p >q nor p >~q are true. But, if a partial interpretation assumes a disjunct 
as true, its opposite cannot be assumed as well. So, not only CEM is safe, but the 
Uniqueness assumption too--contrary to what Lewis held.  
About the argument against CEM involving the might-conditional, Stalnaker held 
that it does not work seriously. Indeed, it presupposes that Lewisǯ definition of ǲ◊՜ǳ 
would be accepted. At that purpose, Stalnaker considered it too much simplistic to explain a complex structure like that of ǲmightǳ, while the right thing to do should 
be, first of all, inquiring it outside a conditional context and, then, in relation to a 
conditional analysis. Stalnaker suggested to consider a ǲmightǳ occurring in a 
conditional context such as a standard ǲmightǳ: both a might-non-conditional and a 
might-conditional may express either an epistemic possibility either a non-
epistemic possibility. However, given that most of might-conditionals manifest an 
epistemic possibility--whose scope is the whole conditional, not just the 
consequent--is unacceptable to conjoin it with the negation of the correspondent 
would-conditional--which expresses a necessity on the consequent--, as Lewisǯ 
interpretation allows. It is unacceptable, not because those conditionals are 
contradictories, but because their conjunction would be Moore-paradoxical.75 
As a defense for the Limit assumption, Stalnaker invoked the notion of ǲrelevanceǳ: the worlds have to be similar about relevant respects. Therefore, Lewisǯ 
counterexamples appear no appropriates since they show differences between 
worlds centered on irrelevant aspects--basically they are the same world--, so that 
the selection-function would not be possible.  
In conclusion, Lewisǯ revision, rather than solve those problems of Stalnakerǯs 
account, seems to generate other complications, showing that a semantics of 
possible worlds, although really useful in analyzing conditional statements, still 
                                                          
75 Mooreǯs paradox: assertion like ǲp, but I donǯt believe pǳ and ǲp, but I believe that not-pǳ. See 
Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore, The Arguments of the Philosophers (Routledge: London and New York, 
1990), 226--232. 
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preserves some problems. However, Stalnaker specified that his analysis wants just 
to present the form of truth conditions of conditionals, not to discourage anybody to 
keep on studying such sentences.76 He knew the problem was no solved but his 
theory represents definitely an important support. Reason for what several 
philosophers did not want to renounce, at least in a first moment, to an 
interpretation of conditional statement in terms of semantics of possible worlds.  
Unfortunately, the question got more complicated when a proof involving 
compounds of conditionals, known as Lewisǯ Triviality Result, showed the incompatibility between Stalnakerǯs system and Ramseyǯs Test. Indeed, although C2 
works in accordance with Ramseyǯs Test concerning simple conditionals, it fails with 
compound ones. Therefore, those supporters of both C2 and Ramseyǯs test had to 
make a not easy decision between a system representing one of the best proposal 
for a logic of conditionals and a well-recognized fundamental result in a decision 
theory. For this reason, a lot of philosophers, rather than opt for a choice, prefer 
proposing some solution to avoid the Triviality Result, in view to conciliate Stalnakerǯs theory and Ramseyǯs Test. 
  
                                                          
76 ǲIt may seem that little has been accomplished by this analysis, since it just exchanges the 
problem of analyzing the conditional for the problem of analyzing a semantic function which is 
equally problematic, if not more so. In one sense this is correct: the analysis is not intended as a 
redaction of the conditional to something more familiar or less problematic, and it should not satisfy 
one who comes to the problem of analyzing conditionals with the epistemological scruples of a Hume 
or a Goodman. The aim of the analysis is to give a perspicuous representation of the formal structure 
of conditionals – to give the form of their truth conditions. Even if nothing substantive is said about 
how antecedents select counter factual possible worlds, the analysis still has non-trivial and in some cases surprising, consequences for the logic of conditionals.ǳ Robert C. Stalnaker, ǲIndicative conditionalsǳ, ͳͻͺ--199. 
 ǲ[…] but a formal semantic analysis, by itself, is intended as neither a solution nor a dismissal of 
the problem of counterfactual conditionals. What such analysis purports to do is to clarify the 
abstract structure of a problematic concept in order to help separate formal problems about its logic form substantive problems.ǳ Robert C Stalnaker, Inquiry, (Cambridge MA: Bradford Books, MIT 
Press, 1984), 122. 
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III LEWISǯ TRIVIALITY RESULT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES  
 
1. The Triviality Result  
In 1976 Lewis presented an argument, known as Triviality Result, showing the 
incompatibility between the assumption that the probability of a proposition is the 
probability it is true and the conditional probability.77 In such a way the divorce 
between Stalnakerǯs theory and the Equation is definitely formalized.  
There are a lot of version of the Triviality Result, but I prefer reporting here the Lewisǯ original one78: 
 Preliminaries: 
o Suppose we have a formal language containing at least the truth-
functional connectives plus ǲ՜ǳ. Every connective could be used to 
compound any sentences in this language, whose truth-value is given in 
terms of possible worlds. 
o Define the conditional probability function in such a way: 
 P(q ∣p) =P(q ר p) ∣P(p), if P(p) >079. 
o Assume the following standard probability laws: 
 1 ൒ P(p) ൒ 0. 
 If p and q are equivalent--both true at the same world--, then  
P(p) = P(q). 
 If p and q are incompatible--both true at no world--, then  
                                                          
77 David Lewis, ǲProbabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilitiesǳ, in Ifs: Conditionals, 
Belief, Decision, Chance, and Time, eds. W. L. Harper, R. Stalnaker and G. Pearce (Dordrecht & Boston: 
Reidel Publishing Company, 1981), 129--147. 
78 A simpler version is that by Blackburn. See Simon Blackburn, ǲHow Can We Tell Whether a 
Commitment has a Truth Condition?ǳ, in Meaning and Interpretation, ed. C. Travis (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1986), 201--232.  
79 If P(p) =0 then P(q ∣p) remains undefined. A truthful speaker considers permissible to assert the 
indicative conditional p ՜q just in case P(q ∣p) is sufficiently close to 1, i.e. only if P(q רp) is 
sufficiently greater that P(~q רp). David Lewis, ǲProbabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilitiesǳ, ͳʹͻ. 
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P(p שq) =P(p) + P(q). 
 If p is necessary--true in every worlds--, then P(p)=1.  
o Suppose to interpret ǲ՜ǳ such that: 
 P(p ՜q) = P(q ∣ p), if P(p) > 0, i.e. the probability of a conditional is 
its conditional probability. 
so that, if it holds, this holds too: 
 P(p ՜q ∣ z) = P(q ∣ p ר z), if P(p ר z) > 0. 
 First Triviality Result: 
o Take P(p ר q) and P(p ר~q) both positive, so that P(p), P(q) and P(~q) 
are positive too. Now we have: 
 P(p ՜q) = P(q ∣ p) holds by P(p ՜q) = P(q ∣ p). 
 P(p ՜q ∣ q) = P(q ∣ p ר q) = 1 and P(p ՜q  ∣~q) = P(q ∣ p ר~q) = 0 
hold by replacing z with q or ~q in P(p ՜q ∣ z) = P(q ∣ p ר z). 
o For every sentence r, P(r) = P(r ∣ q) ⋅P(q) + P(r ∣~q) ⋅P(~q) holds by 
expansion. 
o Taking r as p ՜q, we have: 
 P(r) = P(q ∣ p), by P(p ՜q) = P(q ∣ p). 
 P(r ∣ q) = P(q ∣ p ר q) = 1 and P(r ∣~q) = P(q ∣ p ר~q) = 0, by  
P(p ՜q ∣q) = P(q ∣p רq) = 1 and P(p ՜q ∣~q) = P(q ∣p ר~q) = 0.  
So: 
 P(q ∣ p) = 1⋅ P(q) + Ͳ ⋅P(~q) = P(q) holds by substitution on 
P(r) = P(r ∣ q) ⋅ P(q) + P(r ∣~q) ⋅ P(~q). 
o First conclusions:  
 If P(p ר q) and P(p ר~q) are both positive then the propositions are 
probabilistically independent--that is absurd, though no 
contradictory. 
 Assigning standard true-values to any couple of propositions p and q, 
it derives that P(q ∣ p) = P(q), i.e. the conditional probability equals 
the probability of the consequent.  
Consequently: 
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 Any language expressing a conditional probability is a trivial language. 
 Second Triviality Result: 
o Suppose that ǲ՜ǳ is a probability conditional for a class of probability 
functions closed under conditionalizing, and take any probability function 
P in the class and any sentences p and q such that (p ר q) and P(p ר~q) 
are both positive. Proceeding as before, we have again: 
 P(q ∣ p) = P(q). 
o Take three pairwise incompatible sentences q, z and r such that P(q), P(z) 
and P(r) are all positive. Replacing the disjunction (q ש z) with p, we have 
that P(p ר q) and P(p ר~q) are both positive, but P(q ∣ p) does not equal 
P(q). This means there are no such three sentences. 
o Second conclusions: 
 P is a trivial probability function that never assigns positive 
probability to more than two incompatible alternative, so fixing at 
most four different values: P(q)=1 and P(p)=1--determining that 
P(q ∣ p) =1=P(q)--, P(q)=1 and P(p)=0--so that P(q ∣ p) is an 
undefined number--, P(q)=0 and P(p)=1--determining that 
P(q ∣ p) = 0 =P(q)--, P(q)=0 and P(p)=0--P(q ∣ p) is undefined again. 
Consequently: 
 For every class of probability functions closed under conditionalizing, ǲ՜ǳ cannot be a probability conditional unless the class consists 
entirely of trivial probability functions. 
 Given that a probability function represents a possible system of 
belief, and some of such systems are not trivial, then indicative 
conditionals cannot be considered as probability conditionals for the 
whole class of probability functions. 
 It cannot be guaranteed that the probability of a conditional equals 
the corresponding conditional probability for all possible subjective 
probability functions, i.e. it is not a general rule that the absolute 
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probability of a conditional proposition equals the probability of its 
consequence on condition of its antecedent. 
It is quite clear that the second Triviality Result logically entails the first one, 
reason for what Lewisǯ argument is called generally just ǲTriviality Resultǳ.  
 
2. Dealing with trivialization: Stalnaker and Adams 
The consequences generated by the Triviality Result could not have passed unnoticed in conditionalsǯ debate, so that philosophers had to analyze their own 
thesis in front of this result. Hence, Stalnaker noticed that a previously coincidence, 
concerning simple conditionals, between his thesis and Adamsǯ account cannot held 
in relation to compound sentences. However, he kept on considering conditionals as 
standard propositions, finally rejecting the Equation as a general principle. 
Particularly interesting in this regard is the letter written by Stalnaker to van 
Fraassen80, in which he explicitly abandoned the idea to keep the Equation in a C2 
system. Indeed, he presented an argument whose conclusion was the the same of 
Lewis, but by different assumptions. I shall reported it: 
 Given any propositions A, B and C, and any probability function P, a sub-
function PA is a function defined for any P and a proposition A, such that: 
PA(B) =P(B ∣A), with P(A)≠Ͳ.  
 Six thesis follow for reference: 
[1] If P(A)≠Ͳ, P(A >B) =P(B ∣A). 
[2] Any sub-function is a probability function. 
[3] A ǲMetaphysical Realismǳ, according to which the proposition expressed 
by a conditional sentence is independent with respect to the probability 
function defined on it. 
[4] If P(A ר C) ≠ 0, P(A >B ∣ C) =P(B ∣ A ר C). 
                                                          
80 Robert Stalnaker, ǲLetter to van Fraassenǳ, in Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical 
Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, vol. 1, eds. W. Harper and C. Hooker (Dordrecht: Reidel, 
1976), 302--306. 
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[5] The logic of the conditional is that one of C2. 
[6] For any P, there are at most two disjoint propositions having a non-zero 
probability. 
 Lewis derives [6] from [4], and [4] is a generalization of [1], by [3], in such a 
way: 
o Pc(A ר B) = Pc(A) ⋅ Pc(B ∣A) = Pc(A) ⋅ Pc(A >B).  
o [3] permits that Pc(A) ⋅ Pc(A >B) = P(A ∣C) ⋅ Pc(A >B ∣ C)--otherwise the 
conditional could not express the same proposition in both places. 
o Pc(A ר B) =P(A ר B ∣ C) = P(A ∣C) ⋅ P(B ∣ A ר C). 
o Assuming P(A ∣C)≠Ͳ, P(A >B ∣C) = P(B ∣ A ר C). 
 Lewisǯ result--showing how to hold [1] would leads to [6]--depends on the 
assumption [3]. Therefore, technically, rejecting [3] the whole argument fails.  
 However, there is another way to show the same conclusion, without involve 
[3] or [2]. That is showing how, assuming [1], [5] and the denial of [6], we 
have a contradiction: 
o By the denial of [6], we have at least three disjoint propositions to which 
some P assigns a non-zero probability. Take the propositions A ר B ,  
A ר~B  and ~A , abbreviating A  ש(~A ר (A >~B)) with C. 
o By [1] and [5] can be proved: 
[7] If P(~X)≠Ͳ, then P(X >Y  ∣~X) = P(X >Y) 
[8] ~C entails C  >~(A ר~B) 
o Since ~A entails (~A ר (A >B)) ש (~A ר (A >~B))  and P(~A)≠Ͳ, then 
either P(~A ר (A >B)) ≠Ͳ or else P(~A ר (A >~B)) ≠Ͳ.  
o It follows that: 
[9] The propositions A ר B , A ר~B , ~A , C  and ~C  have all non-zero 
probability. 
o Now: 
 By [8], P(C >~(A ר~B) ∣~C) =1. 
 By [9], P(~C) ≠Ͳ. 
 By [7], if P(~C) ≠Ͳ then P(C >~(A ר~B) ∣~C) = P(C >~(A ר~B)) =1. 
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 By [9] again, P(C)≠Ͳ. 
 By [1], If P(C)≠Ͳ, P(C >~(A ר~B)) = P(~(A ר~B) ∣C)) =1. 
 So, P(~(A ר~B) ∣C)) = �ሺ஼ ר~ሺ஺ ר~஻ሻሻ�ሺ஼ሻ  =1. 
 It derives that  �ሺሺ஺ ר஻ሻש(~஺רሺ஺>~஻ሻ)ሻ�ሺሺ஺ר஻ሻשሺ஺ש~஻ሻש(~஺רሺ஺>~஻ሻ)ሻ=1. 
 Consequently, P(A ר~B) =0, contradicting [9]! 
So, Stalnaker concluded that, if we want to keep C2, avoiding troubles, we should 
reject the Equation. But it is not the only reason. Indeed, we could however decide 
to keep the Equation rather than C2. In that case, Stalnaker said we should know 
there are also several intuitive arguments against the thesis that the probability of a 
conditional equals the conditional probability.  
Other philosophers, considering the Equation such as a great result in conditionalsǯ treatment, preferred to preserve it, opting rather for trying to avoid Lewisǯ argument. First among all, there is Adams. He found in the Triviality Result 
an occasion for supporting his own thesis, recognizing it as a proof that indicative 
conditionals have not neither truth-values nor truth conditions. So, we must 
interpret their probability such as a conditional probability, not as probability of 
truth--otherwise we get a trivialization. Although, as previously anticipated, I am no 
totally convinced that Adams would have concluded in a so ǲdrasticallyǳ way --
rejecting any relation between truth and conditionals--unless any Triviality Result 
had been presented, it is unquestionable that he always used to spoke in terms of 
assertability rather than truth. Given that assertability generally goes with 
probability and the probability of a standard proposition is probability of truth, the 
reason for what this does not work with conditionals--how the Triviality Result 
showed--might be because they lack of truth-conditions. Therefore, Adamsǯ 
suggestion to deny truth conditions and values looked practically ad hoc…but not 
for Lewis! Indeed, examining Adamsǯ conclusion, Lewis claimed that it is actually 
invulnerable to the Triviality Result. This is because Adams, neither identifying 
conditional probability with probability of truth nor claiming that probabilities of 
conditional sentences obey to standard probability laws--but just to assertability 
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laws--, made his hypothesis avoiding any proof built on the application of standard 
probability calculus to the probabilities of conditionals--like Triviality Result is. So, 
Lewis did not intend arguing against conditionals as lacking of truth-conditions, but 
he simply objected Adamsǯ insistence to call such a probability just ǲprobabilityǳ. 
Instead, he should have denoted a different term, because that one universally 
evokes a probability obeying to the laws of standard probability calculus. Therefore, 
according to Lewis, a position à la Adams could be better expressed rejecting either 
truth-values either probability of the indicative conditionals. 
Anyway, the real problem of Adamsǯ conclusion concerns compound sentences. 
Indeed, even if he was right, and conditionals with truth-valued antecedent and 
consequent would be governed only by assertability rules--different from standard 
probability rules--, what about those conditionals compounded of conditional 
antecedent and consequent, lacking themselves of any value, condition and 
probability of truth? Adams should admit that the common idea according to which we can know compound sentencesǯ truth conditions is by the truth conditions of 
their sub-sentences. But, how could it be possible when sub-sentences lack truth 
conditions? In that case we need something different from those assertability rules, 
because in front of this new evidence they are not able to show how compound 
sentences work. We need at least a new semantics containing special rules or 
anything else able to explain them. 
So, although Lewis did not explicitly reject Adamsǯ conclusion, it was pretty clear 
that he did not agree either. Rather, he thought that ǲfortunately a more 
conservative hypothesis is at handǳ81: Griceǯs theory. Its conversational rules could 
be identified with those special rules useful to understand why assertability goes 
with conditional probability. So, basically Lewis was suggesting that we should start from something already known, rather than run into those complications Adamsǯ 
hypothesis requires. For this reason he adopted the material conditionalǯs truth 
conditions, explaining the discrepancy between its probability of truth and its 
                                                          
81 David Lewis, ǲProbabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilitiesǳ, ͳ͵͹. 
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assertability by a Gricean implication. In a first moment Lewis talked about a 
conversational implication, but then he opted for Jacksonǯs theory, in favor of a 
conventional one82: ǲAn indicative conditional is a truth-functional conditional that conventionally 
implicates robustness with respect to the antecedent. Therefore, an indicative 
conditional with antecedent A and consequent C is assertable iff (or to the extent 
that) the probabilities P(A ⊃C) and P(A ⊃C/A) both are high. If the second is high, 
the first will be too; and the second is high iff P(C/A) is high; and that is the reason 
why the assertability of indicative conditionals goes by the corresponding 
conditional probability.ǳ83 
 
3. Edgingtonǯs argument 
Adams managed anyway--maybe in a too simplistic way, or maybe not--to avoid 
the Triviality Result and conserve the Equation, so catching the attention of many 
philosophers. Dorothy Edgington is certainly one that, among them, presented a 
great argument in his support. 
She developed a less technical variant of Adamsǯ hypothesis: ǲWe are frequently uncertain whether if A, B, and our efforts to reduce our un-
certainty often terminate, at best, in the judgment that it is probable (or improbable) 
that if A, B. Of course, the truth-conditions theorist does not have to deny these 
undeniable facts. For him, to judge it more or less probable that if A, B is to judge it 
more or less probable that its truth conditions obtain. But this pinpoints his mistake. I 
show that uncertainty about a conditional is not uncertainty about the obtaining of 
any truth conditions. If a conditional had truth conditions, it would be. Therefore, a 
conditional does not have truth conditions.ǳ 84 
In support of the thesis that conditional sentences have not truth conditions of 
any kind, Edgington presented her famous arguments against the material conditional ǲ⊃ǳ--showing that it is generally weaker than the indicative conditional, 
                                                          
82 David Lewis, Philosophical Paper: Volume II (USA: Oxford University Press, 1987), 151--156. 
83 David Lewis, Philosophical Paper: Volume II, 153. 
84 Dorothy Edgington, ǲDo Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?ǳ, Crítica vol. 18 (1986): 6--7. 
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so that it would be wrong to identify ǲ՜ǳ such as ǲ⊃ǳ--and against non-truth-
functionality.85  
First, Edgington showed that the well-known paradoxes of material conditional 
are not exactly overcome neither in a Gricean account. Indeed, according to her, Griceǯs idea to invoke the contrast between what is reasonable to believe and what 
is reasonable to assert is appropriate to explain just the disjunction, but not a 
material conditional. This is because such a contrast is not generally discernible 
when we have to do with conditional statement, showing a distinction between 
disjunctions and conditionals. So, whenever not prepared to reject the material 
conditional, we should accuse the speaker of inconsistent belief, although he really 
does not feel unreasonable at all. Of course, this is not the case of someone who is 
totally certain about a proposition--given that we would not assert any indicative 
conditional with a p antecedent when we are 100% certain about ~p. But, on the 
other hand, if someone is 90% certain about ~p, it is absolutely plausible to talk 
about what will be the case if p. In such a circumstance, according to the material conditionalǯs account, the speaker must rationally be at least ͻͲ% certain of any 
conditional with a p antecedent. So, according to a ⊃-reading, it should be absurd to 
believe--even not with totally certain--that 
[1] ǲBerlusconi will not win next electionsǳ (~p) 
is true and to reject that 
[2] ǲIf Berlusconi wins next elections, he will be a good presidentǳ (p ՜q) 
--given that ǲp ⊃qǳ equals ǲ~p שqǳ.86  
In other words, Edgington is saying it is too much--or at least weird--that the 
falsity of the antecedent makes true a conditional statement. That would be 
                                                          
85 See Dorothy Edgington, ǲDo Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?ǳ, ͵--39, and Dorothy Edgington, ǲOn Conditionalsǳ, Mind vol. 104 (1995): 235--329. 
86 This is a classic paradox of material conditional due to the fact that the antecedentǯs falsity 
always determines the truth of ǲ⊃ǳ. 
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wonderful, but it does not work really! Hence, we need an interpretation of ǲ՜ǳ 
stronger than a material conditional, able to work when ǲ⊃ǳ fails. 
Edgington tried to explain which kind of reasoning we make when we accept [1]-
-because highly probable--and reject [2]. This is an example about how someone 


















So, in Edgingtonǯs account, our belief on q--assuming p--is really low, leading the 
speaker to reject the conditional. In spite of that, treating [2] as p ⊃q, his belief on 
the conditional would equal his belief on ~p שq, which is highly probable. 
In addition, the table below shows that, while the improbability of p ר~q is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the probability of the material conditional, 
~p p 
 





~q  q q ~q 
~p שq = p ⊃q p ר~q 
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this is not the case of Edgingtonǯs analysis--where it is a necessary but not a 
sufficient status.  The same method can be used to consider another paradoxical case met by ǲ⊃ǳ, 
according to which if we are 90% certain about p we have to highly believe in any 
conditional having p as its consequent. Hence, would be irrational to think--even not 
with totally certain--that 
[3] ǲThe actual government will win the next electionsǳ ሺq)  
is true but also that [Ͷ] ǲIf a financial scandal involving the actual President emerges, then the actual 
government will win the next electionsǳ (p ՜q) 











 ~p שq = p ⊃q 
 
                                                          
87 This is the other classic paradox of material conditional due to the fact that the consequentǯs 
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If all of these arguments are not sufficient to discourage the reader to pursue a material conditionalǯs account, Edgington also reminded us it does not work much 
better with compound sentences either. 
In conclusion, she showed that to believe in an indicative conditional does not 
coincide with believing in the truth-functional conditional ǲ⊃ǳ , so that would be 
wrong to assign to ǲIf p, qǳ the same truth conditions of p ⊃q. This is because when 
we believe an indicative conditional we are considering how probable it is, on the 
supposition its antecedent is true. It follows that:  ǲX believes that ሺjudges it likely thatሻ if A, B, to the extent that he judges that 
A&B is nearly as likely as A or, roughly equivalently, to the extent he judges A&B to be more likely than A&~B.ǳ88 
This means that we believe in an indicative conditional p ՜q when the ratio �ሺ௣ ר௤ሻ�ሺ௣ሻ  is high, i.e. when its conditional probability is high. 
But what about other kinds of truth conditions? Can a non-truth-functional 
account give a good reading of p ՜q? Well, Edgington said that, however, there are 
more arguments in favor of her suppositional account rather than any non-truth-
functional interpretation. Indeed, unlike non-truth-functionality, her interpretation 
can preserve the force of the standard truth-functionality guaranteeing that, given 
any two propositions p and q, the confidence in p שq is sufficient for the certainty of  
~p ՜q. This does not happen with non-truth-functionality. On the other hand, Edgingtonǯs account agrees with the non-truth-functional interpretation about the 
possibility of disbelieving either p either p ՜q. 
So, showing that in standard logic a suppositional view is not compatible with 
both truth-functional and non-truth-functional interpretations, Edgington 
concluded that there are no evidence to assign truth conditions of any kind to 
indicative conditionals. Consequently, the probability of a conditional cannot 
represent the probability that any proposition is true, but it is just the conditional 
probability P(q ∣p).  
                                                          
88 Dorothy Edgington, ǲDo Conditionals Have Truth Conditions?ǳ, ͳ͹. 
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In such a way Edgington showed that Lewisǯ Triviality Result does not surprise 
at all, but it just represents a different argument demonstrating that P(q ∣p) cannot 
be the truth-probability of any proposition. So, according to Edgington, the right 
position to adopt in front of the trivialization is conserving the Equation and 
denying any kind of truth-conditions for conditional sentences, like her arguments 
showed independently from Lewisǯ result. 
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IV 
THE LOGIC OF TRIEVENTS 
 
1. De Finettiǯs original trievents Lewisǯ triviality Result had the consequence to split up the philosophical debate 
over conditional statements in two viewpoints: propositional or non-
propositional.89 This is because the common idea was that the only way to avoid a 
trivialization would be denying that a conditional is true or false. In other words, to elude Lewisǯ proof we should not treat conditional statements as standard 
propositions--having truth conditions. So, who is not prepare to assume a non-
propositional position seems to have the only option to reject the Equation-- 
P(p ՜q) = P(q ∣p), when P(p)>0--assuming that conditionals always have truth 
conditions. Given that Lewisǯ result depends on the assumption that conditional statements 
are two-valued propositions, my aim is to consider a third option questioning that a 
conditional can just have two values, but rather that it may be true, false or neither 
true nor false. In such a way it is not necessary, for avoiding the Triviality Result, to 
make a decision between to deny every kind of truth condition and to hold the 
Equation. Proving that such a different manner to elude any trivialization can be 
pursued, we do not have to renounce to assume a propositional viewpoint 
maintaining also the thesis that the probability of a conditional is its conditional 
probability.  
The propose I will analyze is that one developed by Alberto Mura who, 
modifying the original de Finettiǯs three-valued semantics, provided a middle way 
between the above viewpoints. The intent is that of finding a new semantics able to incorporate Adamǯs logic such a fragment of a (three-valued) partial modal logic, 
helping in solving those problems related to compound and iterated conditionals. 
                                                          
89 With the term ǲpropositionǳ I mean a statement having in general a truth-value. In case of two-
valued logic a proposition can just be true or false, while in a three-valued logic it can be true, false or 
even null.  
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I shall introduce, first, the original de Finettiǯs theory, fundamental for understanding Muraǯs contribute. 
Bruno de Finetti is known to be the founder--together with Ramsey, but 
independently--of the subjective interpretation of probability. He developed an 
analysis in terms of a betting system: probability is a special case of prevision 
corresponding with the price of a bet. In case of a conditional bet, that is a gamble on 
a proposition q supposed that an event p happens, its price will equal the 
conditional probability of q ∣p, i.e. a conditional bet coincides with a suppositional 
conditional. 90 
According to de Finetti, a conditional bet on q supposed that p will be (i) win 
when either p either q are true, (ii) lost when p is true and q false, (iii) called off 
when p is false. Therefore, he suggested to assign to q ∣p a truth-value just in case of 
win or loss, and to consider it null--neither true neither false--when the bet is 
cancelled. In such a way a conditional event appears as a three-valued proposition, called ǲtrieventǳ. 
So, in 1935, de Finetti proposed a kind of logic of conditional events, known as ǲLogic of Trieventsǳ, consisting in a three-valued logic expressing in a significant 
form the question concerning conditional probabilities.91 The basically idea is that 
the act to assume a standard two-valued logic is just a conventional issue: 
propositions are not true or false because of a priori principle, but because we 
conventionally decided to call ǲpropositionsǳ those logical entities needing of a ǲyesǳ 
                                                          
90 De Finetti made use of the notion of ǲconditional expectation”--P(X | H) = P(X ר H)/P(H)--
introduced by himself in 1931, that allows to interpret the conditional probability such as the expected 
conditional value of the prize of a conditional bet. This is important because Stalnaker & Jeffrey and 
McGee made the mistake to consider the value of a conditional bet such as the absolute expectation 
value of its prize, interpreting a called off bet such as zero profit. But in the Bayesian theory a called 
off bet is something which remains unchanged to positive linear transformations--there is not any 
zero equipped of an intrinsic value. 
91 Bruno de Finetti ሺͳͻ͵ͷሻ, ǲThe Logic of Probabilityǳ, Philosophical Studies 77, (Netherlands: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 181--190. Translated by R. B. Angell from Bruno de Finetti, ǲLa logique de la probabilitéǳ, in Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique (Sorbonne, 
Paris: Hermann Éditeurs, 1936), IV 1--9.  
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or ǲnoǳ as answer. But, if we agreed on assume three values, we could have an 
analogue of standard logic, but with more values, differing just in a purely formal 
way.  
In the Logic of Trievents the third value is not, strictly speaking, a value like ǲtrueǳ or ǲfalseǳ. It should be considered as a third possible attitude that someone can adopt toward a proposition when he is in doubt between answering ǲyesǳ or ǲnoǳ. In other word, this third value is void--or null--and can be understood as a gap. 
However, a null event is something different from an indeterminate event á la Łukasiewicz--whose truth conditions are unknown. Rather, de Finetti meant an 
event whose conditions under which it would be true or false are not satisfied. We can find several de Finettiǯs papers talking about this third value and he has never 
changed his interpretation about that. It is particularly interesting the passage in which he identified a null event with an ǲaborted eventǳ:  
 ǲIf a distinction results in being incomplete, no harm done: it would mean that besides ǲtrueǳ and ǲfalseǳ events I would also have ǲnullǳ events, or, so to speak, 
aborted events. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes useful to consider explicitly and intentionally from the very start such a ǲtrieventǳ ሺespecially, as will be seen later, with respect to probability theoryሻ. If, for instance, I say: ǲsupposing that I miss the train, I shall live by carǳ, I am formulating a ǲtrieventǳ, wich will be either true or 
false if, after missing the train, I leave by car or not, and it will be null if I do not miss the train.ǳ92 





                                                          
92 Translation by Alberto Mura of Bruno de Finetti (1934), Lǯinvenzione della verità (Milano: 
Cortina, 2006), 103, in: Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, in Bruno 
de Finetti Radical Probabilist, ed. M. C. Galavotti (London: College Publications, 2009), 204.  
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P q ~p p שq p רq p ⊃q 93 q ∣p 
T T F T T T T 
T F F T F F F 
T N F T N N N 
F T T T F T N 
F F T F F T N 
F N T N F T N 
N T N T N T N 
N F N N F N N 
N N N N N N N 
 
While conjunction and disjunction basically coincide with those ones proposed by Łukasiewiczǯ three-valued logic, conditioning is the new truth-function 
introduced by de Finetti. So, the real innovation consists just in the truth-functional connective ǲ∣ǳ. 
According to de Finetti, such a kind of logic should help us to manage those 
troubles due to a two-valued analysis, with the advantage that every proposition can 
be translated in terms of standard logic--given that every trievent is a simply formal 
representation of pairs of ordinary events.94 Indeed, a return from the Logic of 
Trievents to the standard two-valued logic is possible by the introduction of two 
                                                          
93 This material conditional is today known as ǲKleeneǯs strong material implicationǳ, because independently proposed later by Kleene in ͳͻ͵ͺ. See Stephen C. Kleene, ǲOn Notation for Ordinal 
Numbersǳ, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 3, No. 4 (1938): 150--155. 
94 However, it should be pointed out that the algebra of such a pairs of ordinary events--isomorphic to the trieventsǯ algebra--is not Boolean. It is rather a distributive lattice that does not admit a unique 
complement--it means it does not hold CEM. 
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operations: thesis (T ) and hypothesis (H ). 95 T(X) means ǲX is trueǳ and H(X) means ǲX is not nullǳ: 96 
X T(X) H(X) 
T T T 
F F T 
N F F 
The above truth-table shows it holds that X =T(X) ∣H(X), i.e. every trievent ϕ is 
true, given that it is not null. This result is known as ǲde Finettiǯs Decomposition Theoremǳ.97  
Given that every trievent can be represented by any conditional event q ∣p-- 
where p and q are ordinary events--, for the Decomposition Theorem it holds that  
q ∣p = T(q ∣p) ∣H(q ∣p). Looking at the truth-table of ǲ∣ǳ, excluding those cases where 
p and q are aborted events, the Decomposition Theorem leads to two important 
consequences: 
 q ∣p is true if and only if both p and q are true--T(q ∣p) = p ר q. 






                                                          
95 The rule of Thesis and Hypothesis is just that of allowing a conversion into standard logic. So, 
technically, they are not operators belonging to the logic of Trievents. About this, see Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, in Bruno de Finetti, Radical Probabilist, ed. M. C. 
Galavotti (London: College Publications, 2009), 207--209. 
96 In terms of betting system, ǲthe Ǯthesisǯ of the tri-event, is the case in which one has established that the bet is won; the Ǯhypothesisǯ the case in which one has established that the best is in effectǳ. 
Bruno de Finetti ሺͳͻ͵ͷሻ, ǲThe Logic of Probabilityǳ, 186. 
97 So called by Alberto Mura. See Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, 
208. 
p q q ∣p 
T T T 
T F F 
F T N 
F F N 
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Thus, it results that q ∣p =T(q ∣p) ∣H(q ∣p) = (p ר q) ∣p.  
If p is not a tautology it means it could be false, so that q ∣p is not an ordinary 
event. Consequently, an ordinary event is nothing less than a particular case of a 
trievent when p is a tautology. Therefore, ǲto introduce the notion of conditional 
probability is to extend the definition of P(X) from the field of ordinary events, X, to 
the field of tri-eventsǳ.98 In Mura 2009 we can find two methods to obtain such 
extension99: 
 First, a probability function on a Boolean algebra B   of ordinary events has to 
be defined, and then it can be extend to a quotient lattice L   by de Finettiǯs 
Decomposition Theorem, because for every element X of L   there are two 
element, p and q, in B  such that X =q ∣p . Assumed the last result, an 
extension is given simply in such a way: P(q ∣p) = P(p ר q) ∣P(p)--provided 
P(p)>0.  
 Alternatively, a probability function can be defined directly on L --so that it 
will remain however defined on B , because it is contained in L --in such a 
way: 
o Representing the original de Finettiǯs operations T(X) and H(X) respectively by the symbols ՛ and ՟, it holds that ՛X = ǲX is trueǳ and  ՟X = ǲX is not nullǳ. 
o Be P  a partially probability function such that P(X) is not defined if and 
only if P( ՟X)=0.  
o the following axioms holds: 
[A1]. If P( ՟p)>0 then P(p)൒0. 
[A2]. P( ⊤)=1. 
                                                          
98 Bruno de Finetti ሺͳͻ͵ͷሻ, ǲThe Logic of Probabilityǳ, ͳͺͶ--185. 
99 Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, ʹͳͶ--216. 
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[A3]. If P( ՟p)>0 then P(p) = �ሺ՛௣ሻ�ሺ՟௣ሻ 100. 
[A4]. P( ՛(p שq)) = P( ՛p) + P( ՛q) ⎼P( ՛(p ר q)). 
[A5]. If P( ՟p)>0 then P(~p) =1 ⎼ P(p). 
o Proving the following theorem: 
 if P is a probability function defined over B   and if, for every X א L , it 
holds that P( ՟X)>0, then there exist two elements p and q אB  such 
that X =q ∣p and P(X) = �ሺ௣ ר ௤ሻ�ሺ௣ሻ  
we are also demonstrating that the above axioms provide the same class 
of functions obtained by the first extension method. 
 Proof of the above theorem: 
o Let p and q be any element of B  and let PB  a probability function defined on ℬ: 
 [A1] and [A2] are trivially satisfied. 
 Since p אB, it holds that p =՛p and ՟p =⊤. 
 Since P( ⊤)=1, [A3] is trivially satisfied too. 
 Since ՛(p שq) =(p שq), ՛p =p, ՛q =q and ՛(p ר q) =(p ר q), [A4] is 
obviously satisfied. 
 Since ՟p =⊤, P( ՟p) =1 so that [A5] equals, with respect to the 
element of B, the axiom of complement. Hence, [A5] is satisfied as 
well. 
 Given that PB  satisfies every axioms [A1]—[A5], then it is a 
probability function defined on B . 
o Let X א L   be such that X =q ∣p--where p, q א B  : 
 By [A3] it holds that P(X) = P(q ∣p) = �ሺ՛ሺ௤ ∣ ௣ሻሻ �ሺ՟ሺ௤ ∣ ௣ሻሻ --provided  
P( ՟(q ∣p))>0. 
                                                          
100 A͵ shows that ǲthe probability of trievents depends functionally on the probability of ordinary 
events. Without reference to ordinary events, no set of probability axioms are therefore possible for trieventsǳ. Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, ʹͳ͸. 
 77 
Elena Nulvesu, Conditional sentences. Truth conditions and probability, 
Tesi di dottorato in ǲScienze dei Sistemi Culturaliǳ, Università degli studi di Sassari. 
 Given that ՛(q ∣p) = ՛(p ר q), and since p, q אB , it holds that  ՛(p ר q) =(p ר q). 
 Given that ՟(q ∣p) =( ՛p ר ՟q), and since p, q א B , it holds that ՟q =⊤ 
and ՛p =p. 
 Therefore, ՟(q ∣p) = p ר⊤= p. 
 By substitution, it holds that P(X) = �ሺ՛ሺ௤ ∣ ௣ሻሻ �ሺ՟ሺ௤ ∣ ௣ሻሻ  = �ሺ௣ ר ௤ሻ �ሺ ௣ሻ . So, axioms 
[A1]—[A5] provides the same class of function obtained by the 
extension method from a Boolean algebra B   to a quotient lattice L . 
In conclusion, de Finettiǯs analysis shows that every probability function defined 
on a Boolean algebra of ordinary events can be univocally extended to the whole 
trievents lattice, so that, given two standard proposition p and q, the probability of 
the trievent q ∣p equals the ratio between the probability of p ר q and the probability 
of p. Consequently, ǲ∣ǳ appears such as a connective satisfying the Equation but with the advantage of avoiding Lewisǯ Triviality Result--because q ∣p is not an ordinary 
event, but a three-valued proposition. 
 
2. Avoiding Trivialization Basically, Lewisǯ Triviality Result derives from these assumptions:  
(i) P(p ՜q ∣z) = P((q ∣p) ∣z) =P(q ∣(p ר z))--with P(p ר z) >0. 
(ii) P(r) = P(r ∣q) ⋅ P(q) + P(r ∣~q) ⋅ P(~q). 
Both entail the trivialization: 
(iii) P(q ∣p) = P(q).101 
Therefore, conditioning would be satisfied just in a few special (banal) cases so 
that, technically, ǲ∣ǳ cannot be a standard truth-functional iterable connective. But, 
what about considering r as a trievent?  
Although (i) is generally satisfied by de Finettiǯs conditioning, (ii) is not. Indeed: 
                                                          
101 Replacing z with q or ~q it holds that P(q ∣(p רq)) = 1 and P(q ∣(p ר~q)) = 0. Replacing r as q ∣p 
we have that P(q ∣p) = P((q ∣p) ∣q) ⋅P(q) + P((q ∣p) ∣~q) ⋅P(~q). By substitution, it holds:  
P(q ∣p) = P(q ∣ሺp רq)) ⋅P(q) + P(q ∣ሺp ר~q)) ⋅P(~q) =P(q). 
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 By [A3] we obtain the following generalization of (ii): 
(iv) P(r) = �ሺ՛௥ሻ�ሺ՟௥ሻ = �ሺ՛୰ ∣՛୯ሻ⋅�ሺ՛௤ሻ + �ሺ՛௥ ∣~՟௤ሻ ⋅�ሺ~՟௤ሻ+ �ሺ՛௥ ∣՛~௤ሻ ⋅�ሺ՛~௤ሻ  �ሺ՟௥ሻ  102. 
 (iv) can be reduced to (ii) when, for q and r both belonging to B ,  
P( ՟r) = P( ⊤) =1, P(~՟q) = P(⊥) =0 and P( ՛r) = P(r). 
 There is no reason for requiring that (ii) would be in general satisfied by 
trievents, given that it is just a special case--with n=2--of the so called 
Conglomerative Property, according to which, for every finite partition of 
ordinary events q1,…, qn  such that q1 ר qj = ⊥ ሺͳ ൑ i < j ൑ n) and q1 ש…  שqn =⊤, it holds: 
(v) P(r) = P(r ∣q1) ⋅ P(q1) +…+ P(r ∣~qn) ⋅ P(~qn)103. 
  (iv) is a special case of (v) too--with n=3--and it is exactly the generalization 
of (ii) for trievents. Indeed, we can naturally represent in B   any ordinary 
event p by a partition of two elements--{p, ~p } = {՛p, ՛~p }--and any 
trievent q by a partition of three elements--{՛q, ~՟q, ՛~q }. This is also 
confirmed by the theorem according to which:  
 Let p, q, r  be three elements in B   forming a partition and let that  
K = {y  א L  ∣՛y =p, ՛~y =q, ~՟y =r }. Satisfying such a conditions, K 
contains just one element. 
o Proof: 
 Let V be the set of all valuations V: L   ՜ {t, f, n} and let y = p ∣(p ש~r). 
 For every valuation v in V it holds: v(p)=t iff v(y)=t--so that  ՛y = ՛p = p--, v(q)=t iff v(y)=f--so that ՛~y = q--, and v(r)=t iff 
v(y)=n--so that ~՟y = r. 
 y אK and K≠Ø. 
                                                          
102 To be clear: ՟X = ǲX is not nullǳ; ~ ՟X = ǲX is nullǳ; ՛X = ǲX is trueǳ; ՛~X = ǲX is falseǳ; ~ ՛X = ǲq is not trueǳ = ǲX is null or falseǳ. 
103 (v) derives from:  
 P(r ∣q) = �ሺ௥ ר ௤ሻ�ሺ௤ሻ  ; P(r רq) = P(r ∣qሻ⋅P(q). 
 If q1, ..., qn is exhaustive and mutually exclusive, then P(r) = P(r רq1) +…+P(r רqn). 
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 Suppose that both w1 and w2 belong to L , such that: ՛w1 = ՛w2 = p ; ՛~w1 = ՛~w2 =q ; ՝w1 = ՝w2 = r. 
 Suppose that, for some v in V, it holds v(w1) ≠ v(w2). 
 It holds that: if v(w1)=t then v( ՛w1)=t and v( ՛w2)=f--against the 
hypothesis--; if v(w1)=f then v( ՛~w1)=t and v( ՛~w2)=f--against the 
hypothesis--; if v(w1)=n then v(~՟w1)=t and v(~՟w2)=f--against the 
hypothesis again. Therefore, w1 = w2. 
So, we just need to notice that ՛y, ՛~y and ~՟y all belong to B   and form a 
partition, to prove the theorem according to which: 
 For every trievent y  א L   there exists a partition of events p, q, r 
belonging to B   such that p = ՛y, q = ՛~y, r  =~՟y . 
In conclusion, it seems de Finetti knew clearly that, if p and q are two events 
satisfying the excluded middle law, then q |p cannot be interpreted as such event. 
But, considering it as a trievent, then ǲ∣ǳ appears as a suppositional connective able 
to represent in a good way the conditional probability. 
 
3. De Finettiǯs difficulties 
Although de Finettiǯs account can represent a way to avoid trivialization 
conserving the Equation it is not free from problems, making it unable to provide a 
right semantic for conditional statements.  
Firstly, the correspondence between logic and probability, in spite of increasing 
in relation to some aspects, loses some properties on the other side. Among them, 
the fact that in de Finettiǯs account ϕ ∣ϕ is not a tautology, but a quasi-tautology, 
because although it is not false it can be either true or null. So, given any p and q and 
any probability function P, if P(p) = P(q) but p ∣p is not truth-functionally 
equivalent to q ∣q,  then p ≠q. In other words, it does not work the propriety 
according to which, when two trievents have same probability, the respective 
propositions are logically equivalent. This means there are a variety of trievents, to 
which every probability function assigns probability 1, but not logically equivalent. 
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Similarly, any de Finettiǯs contradiction is a quasi-contradiction104, given that it 
cannot be true, but can be either false or null. So, it is easy to catch that there are 
some elements able to be quasi-tautologies and quasi-contradictions at the same 
time.  
Now, what is wrong with quasi-tautologies and quasi-contradictions? Classical 
probability, defined on a Boolean algebra, is shown as a generalization of 
propositional logic when, for every probability function P, the following properties 
are satisfied: 
 p ൑q if and only if P(p) ൑ P(q). 
 If P(p) = P(q) then p =q. 
While the first property is easily satisfied by the probability of trievents105, the 
second one is not, because the only fact that P(p) =P(q) is not sufficient to 
guarantee that p =q. And it is not sufficient just because every tautology and every 
contradiction in a trievents account are quasi-tautologies and quasi-contradictions. 
Hence, probability can appears as a generalization of propositional logic in trievents 
only at the prize of losing the property according to which if P(p) =P(q) for every 
probability function then p =q. However, we can consider as tautologies those 
trievents which are true in every case in which they are not null. That is, ϕ is a 
tautology if it is true supposed it is not null--՛ϕ ∣ ՟ϕ.106 
Concerning quasi-tautologies and quasi-contradictions in a betting system, a 
conditional bet on them is a quite degenerate bet, because it would be a gamble 
without a real risk. Indeed, a bet on a quasi-tautology cannot be lost and a bet on a 
quasi-contradiction cannot be won. But, differently from a bet on a standard 
tautology or contradiction, it ca be called off. If this peculiarity seems justify prima 
                                                          
104 Both terms of ǲquasi-tautologyǳ and ǲquasi-contradictionǳ due to Bergmann. See Merrie 
Bergman, An Introduction to Many-Valued and Fuzzy Logic, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 85--86. 
105 p ൑q iff P(p) ൑ P(q) for every P such that P( ՟p)>0 and P( ՟q)>Ͳ. Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, ʹͳͻ. 
106 The identity φ =( ՛φ ∣ ՟φ) always holds for every φ by the de Finetti's Decomposition Theorem. 
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facie the difference in a partial order, actually such a difference is not maintained 
when we coherently set on a bet. Indeed, if I set the same amount of money on two 
different trievents p and q, technically, they should be considered as the same 
trievent. In addition, even the difference between quasi-tautologies (or quasi-
contradictions) and standard tautologies (or standard contradictions) is lost in a 
coherent bet: the profit I can have by a bet on ⊤ is the same of that one I can have by 
betting on a trievent ϕ ∣ϕ. 
In conditional logic the limit of de Finettiǯs account concerns giving a definition of logical consequence in accordance with Adamsǯ logic. Since Adams was able to 
extend such a notion from propositional logic to the logic of simple conditionals in 
perfect conformity with intuition107--except some very artificial cases--, it seems 
absolutely reasonable to request that a good semantic for conditional sentences be 
able to provide a notion of logical consequence in accordance with Adamsǯ 
definition.108  
Actually, de Finetti did not treat this point, but we can easily guess such notion in 
relation with his ideas. So, a logical consequence in a trievents account should 
preserve the property that holds in standard logic, according to which: 
 p ⊨q and q ⊨p if and only if p ≅q, i.e. when two propositions p and q 
entail each other they have the same truth conditions and content. 
To maintain this property in trievents, either truth either non-falsehood has to 
be conserved. Therefore, q is a logical consequence of p if and only if, for every 
evaluation v, the following conditions are preserved: 
 Preservation of truth: if v(p)=t then v(q)=t. 
 Preservation of non-falsehood: if v(p) א {t, n} thenv(q) א {t, n}. 
Now, a notion of logical consequence in accordance with Adamsǯ logic should 
meet the following property: 
                                                          
107 See [THEOREM 3] and [THEOREM 4], 24--25. 
108 In addition, we should not forget that, concerning simple conditionals, Adamsǯ conditional logic basically coincides with Stalnaker and Lewisǯs proposals.  
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o A sentence ϕ is a logical consequence of a set of sentences {ϕ1, …, ϕn} 
if and only if the uncertainty of ϕ is not higher than the sum of the 
uncertainties of ϕ1, …, ϕn, i.e. if and only if u(ϕ) ൑ u(ϕ1) +…+ u(ϕn). 
But, unfortunately, McGee 1981109 presented a result, then generalized by 
Adams 1995110, showing that there is no truth-functional many-valued logic--
included de Finettiǯs Trievents--able to preserve Adamsǯ definition of logical 
consequence.111 Indeed, McGeeǯs result showed that ǲp-validity cannot be 
characterized by a finite matrix, i.e. one cannot describe p-validity as the preservation of a finite set of designated values.ǳ112 This is the proof he advanced: 
 Given a finite matrix M  =ۃM, D, +, ⋅, ⎯, ՛⟩ meeting probabilistic logic--by 
reduction ad absurdum--, (i) D كM is the set of designated values, (ii) +, ⋅, ⎯ 
and ՛ are operations on M, (iii) M has n members and (iv) τ is a truth 
assignment satisfying the following conditions: 
o τሺϕ שɗሻ = τሺϕ) +τሺɗሻ. 
o τሺϕ רɗሻ = τሺϕ) ⋅τሺɗሻ. 
o τሺ~ϕ) = ⎯ τሺϕ). 
o τሺϕ ՜ɗሻ = τሺϕ) ՛τሺɗሻ. 
 Considering α0, …,αn  such as distinct atomic sentences, the inference below is 
not probabilistically valid: α0 ՜~α1 ר~α2 ר … ר~αn α1 ՜~α2 ר~α3 ר … ר~αn αn⎯ͳ ՜~αn ∴ αn ՜~α0 ש~α1 ש … ש~αn 
                                                          
109 Van McGee, ǲFinite Matrices and the Logic of Conditionalsǳ, in Journal of Philosophical logic, vol. 
10 (1981): 349--351. 
110 Ernest W. Adams, ǲRemarks on a Theorem of McGeeǳ, in Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 24 
(1995): 343--348. 
111 It would mean that no three-valued logic can entail Adamsǯ p-validity. 
112 Moritz Schulz, ǲA note on two theorems by Adams and McGeeǳ, in The Review of Symbolic Logic, 
vol. 2 (2009): 510. 
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This means there is a truth assignment τ giving a designated value to every 
premises and an undesignated value to the conclusion. 
 Given that M has only n members, there are i and j such that 0 ൑ i  ൑ j  ൑ n 
and τሺαi) =τሺαj). Now it holds that: τሺαi ՜~αi+1 ר … ר~αj⎯ͳ ר~αi ר~αj+1 ר … ר~αn) = 
= τሺαi) ՛(⎯τሺαi+1) ⋅ … ⋅ ⎯τሺαj⎯ͳ) ⋅ ⎯τሺαi) ⋅ ⎯τሺαj+1) ⋅ … ⋅ ⎯τሺαn)) = 
= τሺαi) ՛( ⎯τሺαi+1) ⋅ … ⋅ ⎯τሺαj⎯ͳ) ⋅ ⎯τሺαj) ⋅ ⎯τሺαj+1) ⋅ … ⋅ ⎯τሺαn)) = 
= τሺαi ՜~αi+1 ר … ר~αj⎯ͳ ר~αj ר~αj+1 ר … ר~αn) א D. 
 So, the premise of the argument   αi ՜~αi+1 ר … ר~αj⎯ͳ ר~αi ר~αj+1 ר … ר~αn ∴ αn ՜~α0 ש … ש~αi ש … ש~αn 
has a designated value although its conclusion has an undesignated value. 
But such argument is probabilistically valid. Therefore, there is a 
contradiction!  
Adams identified the point of such a result in the reason that any many-valued 
logic meets a principle known as condensation property: ǲif replacing more than n distinct sentential variables in an inference by at most 
n distinct variables ('condensing' them) always results in an inference that is valid 
in the sense of many-valued logic, then the original inference must be valid in this 
sense. Since this is not the case in any of the conditional logics, they cannot be 
equivalent to any many-valued logics with finitely many values, no matter how they 
define the conditional.ǳ113 
Finally, I would like to report and analyze Bradleyǯs criticism about some three-
valued approach--included de Finettiǯs one--in conditional treatment.114 I will show 
that, actually, de Finettiǯs Trivents are not totally vulnerable to Bradleyǯs argument. 
Indeed, two of the three counterexamples he presented--trying to show that a 
trivalent proposal would be definitely ǲhopelessǳ--do not hold with de Finettiǯs 
account. 
                                                          
113 Ernest W. Adams, ǲRemarks on a Theorem of McGeeǳ, 343. 
114 Richard Bradley, ǲIndicative Conditionalsǳ, Erkenntnis, 56 (2002): 345--378. 
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Basically, Bradley identified the limit of a three-valued approach in: 
(i) The interpretation of conditionalsǯ conjunctions entails that  
(p ՜q) ר (~p ՜q) is never true. 
(ii) The standard treatment of negation makes the negated conjunct  
~((p ՜q) ר (~p ՜z)) equivalent to the conjunct (p ՜~q) ר(~p ՜~z). 
(iii) It holds the equivalence (p ՜q) ר (~p ՜z) =(p רq) ש(~p רq). 
Now, even if (p ՜q) ר (~p ՜q) is never false, the fact that it is never true 
certainly makes sentences like ǲIf it rains, the match will be played and, if it does not 
rain, the match will be played ሺas wellሻǳ always null. However, (i) come from the 
fact that Bradley assumes the introduction rule for the conjunction, according to 
which: p, q  ⊢ p ר q. But, such a rule does not hold in general for Trievents, so that 
asserting {p, q} does not mean to assert (p ר q). As well, denying a set does not mean 
to deny its elements, but simply no asserting them all together. So that, also (ii) does 
not hold unless assuming the introduction rule for the conjunction. 
Although (i) and (ii) do not work with Trievents, (iii) actually does. So, the 
sentence (p ՜q) ר (~p ՜z) is equivalent to (p ר q) ש(~p ר q), and this does not 
generally hold in natural language. Indeed, according to Bradley, two sentences with 
same truth-value are not necessarily the same thing, given that they can have 
different meaning. This is because Bradley denies that the content of a conditional is 
characterized just by its truth-value. For such a reason propositions with same 
truth-value do not have always same probability--leading Adams to conclude that 
the probability of a conditional is not his probability of truth. 
However, a proposal by Alberto Mura, aiming to solve those problems of de 
Finettiǯs original trievents, seems to overcome also (iii)--that does not hold 
generally in Muraǯs account. In such a way, given that trievents can avoid a 
trivialization, we should be able to either preserve the Equation either fix conditionalsǯ truth conditions. 
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1. Muraǯs Semantics of Hypervaluations In ʹͲͲͻ, Alberto Mura elaborated a modified account of de Finettiǯs Trievents, 
called Semantics of Hypervaluations, with the intent of providing a new semantics for Adamsǯ conditional logic.115 
A hypervaluation is a two-stage valuation, introducing a modal component in the 
second stage. Although a great similarity between it and Van Fraassenǯs 
supervaluation116, there are some important differences: 
o The original motivation to develop a supervaluated account was to save 
classical tautologies, which kept on being supervaluated as true--and 
every contradiction as false. Instead, the hypervaluations need to 
distinguish between classical tautologies and quasi-tautologies, because 
of the null value. Such a difference cannot pertain to the supervaluations 
because in Kleeneǯs logic we never can obtain n. The hypervaluations 
allow to evaluate every non-null quasi-tautology as a tautology, called 
pre-tautology. 
o Because in Kleeneǯs logic there is not the connective ǲ∣ǳ, a sentence ϕ ∣ϕ 
has to be evaluated in a standard way by supervaluations. Contrary, de Finettiǯs account provides ǲ∣ǳ so that, according to hypervaluations, ϕ ∣ϕ 
is a quasi-tautology. 
o While hypervaluations are compositional in character, supervaluations 
are not. Indeed, a classical tautology evaluated as a tautology by 
supervaluations does not work as a tautology in compound sentences. 
                                                          
115 Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, in Bruno de Finetti, Radical 
Probabilist, ed. M. C. Galavotti (London: College Publications, 2009), 201--242. 
116 See Bas Van Fraassen, ǲSingular Terms, Truth-Value Gaps, and Free Logicǳ, Journal of 
Philosophy 68 (1966): 481--Ͷͻͷ, and Bas Van Fraassen, ǲHidden Variables in Conditional Logicǳ, 
Theoria, vol. 40 (1974): 176--190. 
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For example, even if ϕ ש~ϕ is always true by every supervaluation, 
nonetheless (ϕ ש~ϕ) רɗ  is not classically evaluated as ɗ. This kind of 
problem does not concern the hypervaluations, because they use to work 
directly on pre-tautologies, considering them as tautologies keeping on 
holding even in compound sentences. This compositional character of 
hypervaluations makes them recursively defined.  
All of these points make the supervaluations not suitable to work in a trievents 
account. On the contrary, the hypervaluations look just what we need, especially because the fact they have ǲ∣ǳ makes the null value easy to obtain--given that every ⊤∣⊥=n. For such a reason, Mura provided the following account, known as 
Semantics of Hypervaluations:117 
 Definitions:  
[SH-1]. Hypervaluation: given a set S of sentences pertained to L,,, a 
hypervaluation associated with a valuation v is the function hv : S ՜ {t, f, n} 
defined recursively by such conditions: 
(1) For every atomic sentence ϕ, hv(ϕ) =v(ϕ). 
(2) If ϕ =~ɗ then 
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if hvሺɗሻ=f; 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if hvሺɗሻ=t; 
(c) hv(ϕ)=n if hvሺɗሻ≠t and hvሺɗሻ≠f. 
(3) If ϕ =ሺɖ שɗሻ then  
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  hvሺɖሻ=t;  
(ii)  hvሺɗሻ=t;       
(iii) for no valuation w, both hwሺɖሻ and hwሺɗሻ are false, and there is a 
valuation wǯ such that either hwǯሺɖሻ or hwǯሺɗሻ are true. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  hvሺɖሻ=f and hvሺɗሻ=f; 
                                                          
117 Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ. 
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(ii)  for every valuation w, hwሺɖሻ א {f, n} and hwሺɗሻ א {f, n}, and there is 
a valuation wǯ such that both hwǯሺɖሻ and hwǯሺɗሻ are false. 
(c) hv(ϕ)=n if hv(ϕ)≠t and hv(ϕ)≠f. 
(4) If ϕ =ሺɖ ר ɗሻ then  
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  hv(ɖ)=t and hv(ɗ)=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w, hwሺɖሻ א {t, n} and hwሺɗሻ א {t, n}, and there 
is a valuation wǯ such that both hwǯሺɖሻ and hwǯሺɗሻ are true. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  either hvሺɖሻ=f or hvሺɗሻ=f; 
(ii) for no valuation w, both hwሺɖሻ and hwሺɗሻ are true, and there is a 
valuation wǯ such that either hwǯሺɖሻ and hwǯሺɗሻ are false. 
(c) hv(ϕ)=n if hv(ϕ)≠t and hv(ϕ)≠f. 
(5) If ϕ =ሺɖ ՜ɗሻ then hv(ϕ) =hvሺ~ɖ שɗሻ. 
(6) If ϕ =ሺɗ ∣ɖሻ then  
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  hv(ɗ)=t and hv(ɖ)=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w such that hwሺɖሻ=t, hwሺɗሻ א {t, n}, and there 
is a valuation wǯ such that both hwǯሺɗሻ and hwǯሺɖሻ are true. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  hvሺɗሻ f and hvሺɖሻ=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w such that hwሺɖሻ=t, hwሺɗሻ א {f, n}, and there 
is a valuation wǯ such that hwǯሺɗሻ=f and hwǯሺɖሻ=t. 
(c) hv(ϕ)=n hvሺɗሻ≠t and hvሺɗሻ≠f. 
(7) If ϕ =՛ɗ then 
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if hv(ɗ)=t. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if hvሺɗሻ=f or hvሺɗሻ=n.  
(8) If ϕ =՟ɗ  
(a) hv(ϕ)=t if hvሺɗሻ=t and hvሺɗሻ=f. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if hvሺɗሻ≠t and hvሺɗሻ≠f.   
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[SH-2]. Semantic equivalence: two sentences ϕ and ɗ of L   are semantically 
equivalent (ϕ ≈ɗ ) if and only if, for every valuation v, it holds that  
hv(ϕ) = hvሺɗሻ. 
[SH-3]. Pre-tautology: a sentence ϕ of L   is a pre-tautology if and only if, for 
every valuation w it holds that hw(ϕ) א {t, n}, and there exists a valuation wǯ 
such that hwǯ(ϕ)=t. 
[SH-4]. Pre-contradiction: a sentence ϕ of L   is a pre-contradiction if and 
only if, for every valuation w it holds that hw(ϕ) א {f, n}, and there exists a 
valuation wǯ such that hwǯ(ϕ)=f. 
[SH-5]. Factual sentence: ϕ of L   is factual if and only if, given two valuations 
v and w, it holds that hv(ϕ)=t and hw(ϕ)=f.118 
[SH-6]. ϕ of L   is a void sentence if and only if, for every valuation w, it holds 
that hw(ϕ)=n. 
 [SH-THEOREM 1]. For every sentence ϕ, (i) if it is a pre-tautology then ϕ is a 
tautology--that is for every valuation w, it holds that hw(ϕ)=t--and (ii) if it is 
a pre-contradiction then ϕ is a contradiction--for every valuation w, it holds 
that hwሺɗሻ=f. 
o (i). Proof (by induction on the construction of ϕ). We shall consider 
separately the following mutually exclusive cases: 
 If ϕ is an atomic sentence, the thesis is vacuously true because ϕ 
cannot be either a pre-tautology or a pre-contradiction.  
 If ϕ =~ɗ then ɗ is a pre-contradiction and--by inductive hypothesis-- ɗ is a contradiction, so that for every valuation v it holds that hvሺɗሻ=f. 
Hence, ɗ is a contradiction and ϕ--according to definition [SH-1] 
condition (2.a)--is a tautology.  
 If ϕ =ሺɖ שɗሻ for no valuation w it holds that hwሺɖሻ=f and hwሺɗሻ=f, 
since otherwise hw(ϕ)=f, which is inconsistent with [SH-3]. Moreover, 
                                                          
118 A factual sentence may be true or false. If it can be even null, it does not matter now. 
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there exists a valuation w  by which hw(ϕ)=t so that--by [SH-1] 
condition (3)--either hwሺɖሻ=t orhwሺɗሻ=t or there is a valuation wǯǯ 
such that either hwǯǯሺɖሻ or hwǯǯሺɗሻ are true--implying that hwǯǯ(ϕ)=t. 
Therefore, for every valuation v it holds that hv(ϕ)=t, so that ϕ is a 
tautology. 
 If ϕ =ሺɖ רɗሻ then both ɖ and ɗ are pre-tautologies and--by inductive 
hypothesis--ɖ and ɗ are tautologies. Then, for every valuation w, 
hwሺɖሻ=t and hwሺɗሻ=t. Consequently, for every valuation v it holds 
that hv(ϕ)=t, so that ϕ is a tautology. 
 If ϕ =ሺɖ ՜ɗሻ then for every valuation v it holds that  
hv(ϕ) =hv(~ɖ שɗ)--let ɖ=~ɖ , so that ϕ =ሺɖ שɗሻ. The theorem holds 
in virtue of what has been said about the case in which ϕ =ሺɖ שɗሻ. 
 If ϕ =ሺɗ ∣ɖሻ then ɖ ՜ɗ  is a pre-tautology, so that ϕ is a tautology--as 
shown. 
 If ϕ =՛ɗ then ɗ is a tautology, so that for every valuation v it holds 
hv(ϕ)=t--by [SH-1] condition (7.a.)--and ϕ is a tautology. 
 If ϕ =՟ɗ then for every valuation v it holds hv(ϕ)  {t, f}--by [SH-1] 
condition (8.a.). But, for hypothesis, ϕ is a pre-tautology so that it 
cannot be hv(ϕ)=f. It follows that hv(ϕ)=t, for every valuation v. 
Hence, ϕ is a tautology. 
o (ii). Proof. If ϕ is a pre-contradiction then ~ϕ is a pre-tautology and, by 
(a), a tautology. Now, for every valuation v it holds that hv(ϕ) = hv(~~ϕ)-
-[SH-1] condition (2). Since hv(~ϕ)=t, it holds that hv(~~ϕ)= f = hv(ϕ)--
[SH-1] condition (2). Hence, ϕ is a contradiction. 
In such a way Mura provided a semantics able to remove every pre-tautology 
and pre-contradiction, compositionally converting them respectively in standard 
tautologies and standard contradictions.  However, hypervaluationsǯ account maintains some difference from classical 
logic: 
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o No unrestricted substitution rule holds for the Semantics of 
Hypervaluations. It means that every schema of tautologies and 
contradictions does not represent a class of valid sentences as well as the 
same schema represents a class of quasi-tautologies in a three-valued 
logic. That because not every instance of the schema is a tautology. So, we 
will have troubles in considering sentences like ϕ ר~ϕ as tautologies. 
Indeed, ϕ ר~ϕ is valid if and only if ϕ is not null. However, to treat a  ǲϕ ר~ϕǳ schema as a standard one we can fix the condition ǲIf ϕ is not 
null, then ϕ ר~ϕ is a tautologyǳ. Generally, it is not immediately decidable 
that ϕ is not null, because it does not depend just by inspecting ϕ. But it is 
possible to identify algorithmically a void sentence119. 
o In the Semantics of Hypervaluations the truth conditions of sentences are 
not given by simple truth tables. That because [SH-1] entails a modal 
component, due to a reference to the set of all valuations. However, the 
following theorem shows that the truth-value of a sentence depends on 
the valuation of the atomic sentences occurring in it: 
 [SH-THEOREM 2]. Be ϕ be a sentence of L   and ɗ1,…,ɗ2 the atomic sentences 
occurring in ϕ. If there are two valuations v and vǯ such that for every i--with ͳ ൑ i  ൑ n--it holds that vሺɗi) =vǯሺɗi), then hv(ϕ) =hvǯ(ϕ). 
o Proof. By induction on a number n of connectives occurring in ϕ, if n =0, 
then ϕ is an atomic sentence. So, it holds that hv(ϕ) =v(ϕ) =vǯሺϕ) 
=hvǯ(ϕ)--by [SH-1], according the condition for which, for every atomic 
sentence ϕ, hv(ϕ) =v(ϕ). Supposing that n =m +1 and that, for every  
k ൑m, [SH-THEOREM 2] is true, we have these cases: 
 Representing any unary connective with ǲཛǳ, for ϕ =ཛɗ it holds that 
hv(ɗሻ =hvǯሺɗሻ--by inductive hypothesis--, so that hv(ϕ) =hvǯ(ϕ)--by 
[SH-ͳ], according the conditions for ~, ՛ and ՟. 
                                                          
119 The problem about considering φ ר~φ such a tautology is solved in Mura 2012. See Alberto Mura, ǲTowards a New Logic of Indicative Conditionalsǳ, Logic and Philosophy of Science, vol. IX, No. 
1 (2011): 17--31. 
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 Representing any binary connectives with ǲཛྷǳ, for ϕ =ɖ ཛྷɗ it holds 
that hvሺɖሻ =hvǯሺɖሻ and hvሺɗሻ =hvǯሺɗሻ--by inductive hypothesis--, so 
that hv(ϕ) =hvǯ(ϕ) by [SH-ͳ], according the conditions for ש, ר, ՜ and ∣. 
[SH-THEOREM 2] shows that, in spite of its modal component, the hypervaluationǯs account may be considered truth-functional because any 
connective of L   is truth-functional. However, it is not truth-functional in a strict 
(classical) meaning120, but in a generalized sense. In other words, it respects such a 
general definition of truth-functionality: 
 [SH-THEOREM 3]. Any sentential (n-aryሻ connective ⊛ is truth-functionally 
in a generalized sense if and only if the truth-value of any sentences  ɗ = ⊛(ϕ1,…,ϕn) is a function of the truth-values of the atomic sentences 
p1, …,pn  occurring on ɗ. 
According to [SH-THEOREM 3], the Semantics of Hypervaluations allows to 
obtain a truth-table for a molecular sentence determined by every truth-value of the atomic sentences occurring in it. Mura ʹͲͲͻ called this procedure ǲmutant truth-tablesǳ. It simply consists ǲin developing the original truth-table algorithm, every 
computed column is checked for pre-tautology or pre-contradiction and it is 
immediately conserved into a tautology or contradiction respectively before the process continuesǯǳ.121 In other words, Mura suggested a three-step procedure: 
(Step 1). Build the original de Finettiǯs truth-table for a molecular sentence. 
(Step 2). Assume every quasi-tautology--a trievent true or null, but never false--
and every quasi-contradiction--a trievent false or null, but never true--
as a pre-tautology and a pre-contradiction respectively. In such a way 
we obtain a new (mutant) truth-table in which all quasi-tautologies and 
                                                          
120 Any sentential (n-aryሻ connective ⊛ is truth-functionally in a classical sense if the truth-value of any sentence ⊛ሺφ1,…,φn) is a function of the truth-values of the sentences φ1,…,φn . 
121 Alberto Mura, ǲProbability and the Logic of de Finettiǯs Trieventsǳ, ʹʹͺ. 
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quasi-contradictions are immediately converted in tautologies or 
contradictions.  
(Step 3). Check the truth-value of the molecular sentence at the light of this 
mutant truth-table. 
Here an example: consider the molecular sentence (p ∣p) ר (~p ∣~p). 
 


















 Pre-tautologies = Tautologies  
  
  
(Step 3). The sentence (p ∣p) ר (~p ∣~p) is now a tautology: 
 
 
p ~p p ∣p ~p ∣~q (p ∣p) ר(~p ∣~p) 
T F T N N 
F T N T N 
N N N N N 
p ~p p ∣p ~p ∣~q (p ∣p) ר(~p ∣~p) 
T F T  N T N T 
F T N T T N T 
N N N T N T N T 
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In conclusion, the mutant procedure allows to solve the problem of original de Finettiǯs semantic related to the fact that ϕ ∣ϕ is not a tautology. Such a limit leads to consider sentences like ǲSupposed that it is raining then it is raining, and supposed that it is not raining then it is not rainingǳ as null. Instead, the Semantics of 
Hypervaluations makes us able to treat such sentences as tautologies, in perfect 
accordance with the common use in natural language. 
Although the Semantics of Hypervaluations can solve some problems of de Finettiǯs trievents, it is not enough to overcome every limit the original account 
presents. For example, it still cannot avoid McGeeǯs result, so that an incompatibility with Adamsǯ account keeps on holding. For this reason, Mura ʹͲͳʹ proposed a 
refinement of the previous Semantics of Hypervaluations, with the intention of 
figure that out.  
 
2. Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents The refined new account proposed by Mura ʹͲͳʹ is known as ǲTheory of Hypervaluated Trieventsǳ.122 It basically consists in defining a hypervaluation, not 
just in respect of a single valuation, but of a set of valuations. So, we have such a 
definition: 
[THT-1]. Hypervaluation: given a set S of sentences pertained to L, , a 
hypervaluation associated with a valuation v  and with a set V of valuations 
                                                          
122 Alberto Mura, ǲTowards a New Logic of Indicative Conditionalsǳ, Logic and Philosophy of 
Science, vol. IX, No. 1 (2011): 17--31. 
p ~p p ∣p ~p ∣~q (p ∣p) ר(~p ∣~p) 
T F T  T T 
F T T T T 
N N T T T 
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(such that v אV ) is the function ℎ௩�: S ՜ {t, f, n} defined recursively by such 
conditions: 
(1) For every atomic sentence ϕ, ℎ௩�(ϕ) =v(ϕ). 
(2) If ϕ =~ɗ then 
(a) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=f; 
(b) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f if ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=v; 
(c) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=n if ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ≠t and ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ≠f. 
(3) If ϕ =ሺɖ שɗሻ then  
(a) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=t;  
(ii)  ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=t;       
(iii) for no valuation w אV, both ℎ௪� ሺɖሻ and ℎ௪� ሺɗሻ are false, and there 
is a valuation wǯ אV such that either ℎ௪′� ሺɖሻ or ℎ௪′� ሺɗሻ are true. 
(b) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=f and ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=f; 
(ii)  for every valuation w א V, ℎ௪� ሺɖሻ א {f, n} and ℎ௪� ሺɗሻ א {f, n}, and 
there is a valuation wǯ such that both ℎ௪′� ሺɖሻ and ℎ௪′� ሺɗሻ are false. 
(c) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=n if ℎ௩�(ϕ)≠t and ℎ௩�(ϕ)≠f. 
(4) If ϕ =ሺɖ רɗሻ then  
(a) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i) ℎ௩�(ɖ)=t and ℎ௩�(ɗ)=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w א V, ℎ௪� ሺɖሻ א {t, n} and ℎ௪� ሺɗሻ א {t, n}, and 
there is a valuation wǯ such that both ℎ௪′� ሺɖሻ and ℎ௪′� ሺɗሻ are true. 
(b) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  either ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=f or ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=f; 
(ii) for no valuation w, both hwሺɖሻ and hwሺɗሻ are true, and there is a 
valuation wǯ such that either hwǯሺɖሻ and hwǯሺɗሻ are false. 
(c) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=n if ℎ௩�(ϕ)≠t and ℎ௩�(ϕ)≠f. 
(5) If ϕ =ሺɖ ՜ɗሻ then  
(a)  ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
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(i)   ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=t; 
(ii)  ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=f; 
(iii) ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=n and ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ א {t, n}. 
(b)  ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f otherwise.  
(6) If ϕ =ሺɗ ∣ɖሻ then  
(a) ℎ௩�  (ϕ)=t if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  ℎ௩�(ɗ)=t and ℎ௩�(ɖ)=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w א V such that ℎ௪� ሺɖሻ=t, ℎ௪� ሺɗሻ א {t, n}, and 
there is a valuation wǯ such that both ℎ௪′� ሺɗሻ and ℎ௪′� ሺɖሻ are true. 
(b) hv(ϕ)=f if at least one of the following conditions are satisfied: 
(i)  ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ f and ℎ௩�ሺɖሻ=t; 
(ii) for every valuation w such that ℎ௪� ሺɖሻ=t, ℎ௪� ሺɗሻ א {f, n}, and there 
is a valuation wǯ such that ℎ௪′� ሺɗሻ=f and ℎ௪′� ሺɖሻ=t. 
(c) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=n otherwise. 
(7) If ϕ =՛ɗ then 
(a) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if ℎ௩�(ɗ)=t. 
(b) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f otherwise.  
(8) If ϕ =՟ɗ  
(a) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t if either ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=t or ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ=f. 
(b) ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f otherwise.   
(9) If ϕ =⊤ then ℎ௩�(ϕ)=t. 
(10) If ϕ =⊥ then ℎ௩�(ϕ)=f. 
(11) If ϕ =ℕ then ℎ௩�(ϕ)=n. 
In addition, the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents provides a definition of 
modal connectives in terms of primitive connectives: 
[THT-2]. Modal operators: 
 ϕ is void = ⊠ϕ ≝ ~՛(ϕ  ש~ϕ) 
 ϕ is possibly true = 䕺ϕ ≝ ( ⊤՜(ϕ ∣ϕ)) 
 ϕ is possible = 䕻ϕ ≝ 䕺ϕ ∣~⊠ϕ 
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 ϕ is necessary = 䕕ϕ ≝ ~ 䕻~ϕ 
 ϕ is necessarily true = 䕔ϕ ≝ 䕕՛ϕ 
Concerning any other notion, of course it must also be defined in relation to a set 
of valuations: 
[THT-3]. Validity: ϕ is a valid sentence if and only if, for every non-empty set V of 
valuations, ϕ is valid with respect to V.  
o The rule of substitution is restored--by [THT-1]--, so that the previous 
problem holding in the Semantics of Hypervaluations, concerning to 
consider general sentences like ϕ ר~ϕ as tautologies, is solved. 
Therefore, now it is possible to use valid schemas to represent classes of 
valid sentences. 
[THT-4]. Logical equivalence: ϕ and ɗ are logically equivalent if and only if, for 
every V and every v אV, it holds that ℎ௩�(ϕ) = ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ. It follows (i) that ϕ and ɗ 
are logically equivalent if and only if ϕ ՞ɗ is valid--by [THT-1], and (ii) the 
theorem below: 
 [THT-THEOREM 1] Every sentence ϕ of L,  is logically equivalent to a 
sentence ɗ of the form ϕǯ ∣ϕǯǯ  such that the connective ǲ∣ǳ does not occur 
neither in ϕǯ nor in ϕǯǯ and that every atomic sentence of both ϕǯ and ϕǯǯ is immediately preceded by ǲ՛ǳ or ǲ՛~ǳ.  
[THT-5]. Probability: given a set V of valuation and a valuation v אV, the 
hypervaluation ℎ௩�(ϕ) represents an extreme probability function assigning 
probability 1 and 0 to every true and every false trievent respectively, and 
remaining undefined when a trievent is neither true nor false. 
o Given that a trievent X may represent a simple conditional--although it is 
not a standard proposition--, its probability P can be interpreted as the 
expectation E of its truth-value conditional on the hypothesis that the 
trievent is either true or false:  
P(X) = �ሺ�ሻ�ሺ�=଴ ௢௥ �=ଵሻ = P ՛�՟� , with P( ՟X) >0. 
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o Given a trievent expressing the simple conditional q ∣p, its probability can 
be so defined--avoiding Lewisǯ Triviality Result--: 
P(q ∣p) = P ՛ሺ௤∣௣ሻ՟ሺ௤∣௣ሻ = �ሺ௣ר௤ሻ�ሺ௣ሻ . Now, to provide a semantics for Adamsǯ logic by a three-valued account it is not enough to prove that a trivialization can be avoid. Indeed, if the McGeeǯs result still 
keep on holding then no many-valued logic can preserve Adamsǯ definition of logical 
consequence. For that reason, Mura suggested a notion of logical consequence 
modified on a set of hypervaluations. 
 
3. Logical consequence 
Providing a definition of logical consequence in the Theory of Hypervaluated 
Trievents able to get over McGeeǯs result, Muraǯs intent is to build a semantic apparatus for Adamsǯ conditional logic and to extend it to all Trievents--including 
compound conditionals.  
Such a notion of logical consequence is so defined: 
[THT-6] Logical consequence: ɗ is a logical consequence of ϕ if and only if, for 
every set V of Hypervaluations, there is no v אV such that ℎ௩�(ϕ) is true but  ℎ௩�ሺɗሻ is 
not true, and there is v אV such that ℎ௩�(ϕ) א {t, n}, i.e. ϕ ⊨ɗ if and only if, for every 
set V, both preservation of truth and preservation of non-falsehood are respected.  This explains why the connective ǲ՜ǳ adopted in the Theory of Hypervaluations 
represents the material implication.123 Indeed, it is generally required for a material 
implication the property according to which ϕ ՜ɗ is valid if and only if ɗ is a logical 
consequence of ϕ--in a [THT-6] sense. Given that it is exactly the semantic fixed by 
[THT-ͳ] for ǲ՜ǳ, the connective expressed by ǲ՜ǳ in [THT-1] is just the material 
implication for [THT-6]. No other binary connectives can satisfy that property. 
                                                          
123 The fact that in such a theory there is the material conditional is important even in case of 
modus ponens. Indeed, this is a principle holding just with simple conditionals, but not with compounds. However, it is not a surprise given that the connective ǲ|ǳ is not the material implication. In other words, it does not matter if the modus ponens does not work with ǲ|ǳ, because in Muraǯs account there is a ǲ՜ǳ that is material. 
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Now, it should be pointed out that no every property of the standard logical 
consequence keeps on holding in the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents. Indeed, it 
is not preserved the classical property according to which, given a finite set of 
sentences K ={ϕ1, …, ϕn}, ɗ is a logical consequence of K if and only if ɗ is a logical 
consequence of ϕ1 ר … רϕn. That because, as previously anticipated, the 
introduction rule for the conjunction is not valid in this logic. It means that, for every 
i, while ϕi is a logical consequence of ϕ1 ר … ר ϕn, ϕ1 ר … רϕn is not a logical 
consequence of K.  
The lack of the introduction rule makes that {ϕ, ɗ} does not entail in an Adamsǯ 
sense--or ǲp-entailǳ--the conjunction ϕ ר ɗ. So, pragmatically speaking, asserting all 
together two or more sentences does not equal asserting their conjunction. That sounds weird because we are accustomed to think the simultaneous assertion of ǲIf it rains, Iǯll stay at homeǳ and ǲIf it does not rain, Iǯll go to the beachǳ exactly as the assertion of ǲIf it rains, Iǯll stay at home and if it does not rain, Iǯll go to the beachǳ. 
But, according to a trievents account such a conjunction would be semantically null. Therefore, we should not interpret ǲandǳ as a connective between conditional 
sentences, but rather as a connective between speech acts. 
However, we may adopt a three-valued conjunction for which the introduction 
rule holds. Such a different connective has been introduced by Adams himself--but 
only for simple conditionals. It is called ǲquasi-conjunctionǳ and it ǲis verified if and only if none of its parts are falsified and at least one is verifiedǳ. 124 In a three-valued 
logic, that should be interpreted in such a way that a null conjunct is futile in 
determining the truth-value of the conjunction--unless both conjuncts are null, so 




                                                          
124 Ernest W. Adams, A Primer of Probability Logic (Stanford: Csli Publications, 1998), 172. 
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ϕ ɗ ϕ ⩚ɗ 
T T T 
T F F 
T N T 
F T F 
F F F 
F N F 
N T T 
N F F 
N N N 
 We can now define ǲ⩚ǳ according to the Semantics of Hypervaluations, in terms 
of primitive connectives:  ϕ ⩚ ɗ ≝(~՛~ϕ ר~՛~ɗሻ ∣( ՟ϕ ש ՟ɗሻ. 
In such a way, we have a connective for which the introduction rule is valid. But, 
on the other hand, we lose the elimination rule for quasi-conjunction--according to 
which: ϕ ⩚ ɗ ⊢ ϕ and ϕ ⩚ ɗ ⊢ ɗ. But this is not something new. Indeed, Adams had 
already shown that there is no formula of our language such that both introduction 
and elimination rules for conjunction are in accordance with the p-entailment.125 
However, although the limit concerning the elimination rule, preserving the 
introduction rule is now possible to give a general definition of logical consequence 
from a finite set of sentences: 
[THT-7]. Generalization of logical consequence: for every finite set of sentences  Г = {ϕ1, .., ϕn}--with 1 ൑ n ൑ w --, Г ⊨ɗ if and only if either ɗ is valid or there is a subset Гǯ={ϕi1, .., ϕik} of Г--with k ൑n--such that {ϕi1 ⩚ … ⩚ϕik} ⊨ɗ. 
                                                          
125 Ernest W. Adams, A Primer of Probability Logic, 177. 
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In such a way the quasi-conjunction allows a semantical generalization of Adamsǯ p-entailment, so questioning the idea that conditionals always lack of truth 
conditions. This is proved by the following theorem: 
 [THT-THEOREM ʹ]. Given a finite set Г={ϕ1, .., ϕn } of non-void sentences of 
L   and a non-void sentence ɗ of L , the following propositions are 
equivalent: 
 For every probability function P defined for every element of Г and for ɗ, it holds that P(ͳ⎯ɗሻ ൑ ∑ ሺͳ − �ሺ��ሻሻ௡�=ଵ . 
 Г ⊨ɗ. 
o Proof. Such a theorem can be proved easily by indirect way:  
 By de Finettiǯs Decomposition Theorem, every conditional is simple 
and it must have the same probability of a simple conditional. 
 Every axiom of Adamsǯ logic is satisfied for simple conditionals. 
 Even Adamsǯ p-entailment is extended.  
In conclusion, [THT-THEOREM 2] shows that [THT-7] includes Adamsǯ  
p-entailment and allows an extension of it for all trievents in the Semantics of Hypervaluations. In this way, Adamsǯ logic can be interpreted as a fragment of a 
partial modal (three-valued) logic, and we shall have a useful tool for dealing with 
compound sentences.126 
 
4. Trievents and counterfactuals Although Muraǯs account can get over some limits of the original de Finettiǯs 
trievents, it does not allow prima facie to deal with counterfactuals. Indeed, in both 
accounts it holds that, when the probability of the antecedent is 0, then the 
conditional is null--it is neither true nor false. Therefore, every counterfactual seems 
                                                          
126 A fragment of such a hypervaluated trievents account can be considered as a three valued 
version of the S5 system. That because, for every hypervaluated trievent φ it exists a corresponding  
S5-formula φǯ such that φǯ is S5-valid if and only if φ is valid in the Theory of Hypervaluated 
Trievents. However, that is still a work in progress. 
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to be semantically and pragmatically void. This is a limit holding even for Adamsǯ 
logic, so that he restricted his theory to those conditionals whose antecedent is not 
known for certainty to be true or false--that are indicative conditionals. 
Now, an account able to provide a unified thesis for both indicative and 
counterfactual conditionals definitely conserves an advantage. We have already seen that Stalnakerǯs theory can work--although not free from problems--with both 
conditionals, but it has to pay the prize to give up the Equation. The trievents 
account can represent a good option for those who do not want to reject such an 
important intuitive result, but for competing with any other unified theory it is 
important an extension to counterfactuals. For this reason, Mura proposed a 
generalization of the Theory of Hyervaluated Trievents able to catch counterfactual 
conditionals.127 It may be possible introducing a new variable K representing the set 
of accepted ordinary propositions--that are propositions considered true until a 
contrary new evidence. Every trievent is always related to a set K of total beliefs. 
The basic idea is that every information has to communicate something new, 
other from those beliefs two (or more) people have already in common. This is 
absolutely plausible for a pragmatic point of view, and it can be semantically respected either. Indeed, such a ǲsomething newǳ is simply the epistemic content of 
a proposition, keeping out K and representing just what a proposition means. 
So, a generalization of the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents is given 
representing any trievent (q ∣p) such as (q ∣p : K), to indicate that it is always 
associated to a stock K of beliefs. In this way every conditionals is not essentially 
indicative or counterfactual, but just in relation to K. Indeed, in case of indicative 
conditionals, K will be the corpus of the actual beliefs people have at that moment. 
Instead, a counterfactual is not related to an actual K, so that it would be wrong to 
consider it simply as an indicative conditional whose antecedent p is false--being so 
null. Indeed, if our actual corpus of beliefs is K, asserting a counterfactual we should 
                                                          
127 Alberto Mura, ǲRagionamento probatorio a partire da premesse incerte e asserti condizionaliǳ, 
Prospettive Interdisciplinari Per La Giustizia Penale (2014): forthcoming in Cassazione Penale. 
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suppose a different hypothetic stock Kǯ, containing the same information of K but 
differing only about the antecedent--~p is now removed and replaced with p--and 
everything correlated with it.  
Thus, for example, the indicative conditional ǲIf Oswald didnǯt kill Kennedy, someone else didǳ is related to a stock K containing the information that Kennedy 
was killed, but nothing about Oswald such as murderer. Instead, the respective counterfactual ǲIf Oswald hadnǯt killed Kennedy, someone else would have killed himǳ is related to a corpus Kǯ containing the information that Oswald killed Kennedy and nothing about the consequentǯs truth-value.  
In such a way, the truth conditions of conditional sentences are fixed in relation 
to our set of beliefs. In case of counterfactuals, their truth-value equals that one of 
the consequent q, on supposition of a hypothetic set of information. When q is a 
standard bivalent proposition, the counterfactual will express a bivalent proposition 
too, because its antecedent p is entailed by Kǯ. It means that, while an indicative can 
be null, a simple counterfactual is always either true or false--but never null. 
Similarly, a generalization of the Ramseyǯs test is given considering P(q ∣p) in 
relation to a set K of knowledge or suppositions. So we can reformulate the Equation 
in such a way: 
 P(p ՜q : K) = P(q ∣p : K). 
Therefore, the difference between the two classes of conditionals is not 
essentially logical, but epistemic--the logic of the conditionals is the same either for 
indicatives, either for counterfactuals. So, logically speaking there is just one 
conditional. The difference between indicatives and counterfactuals is given by the 
pragmatic fact that using the subjunctive tense there is a conventional implication--the speaker makes to understand that it knows about antecedentǯs falsity and that 
its stock of knowledge is currently different.    If Muraǯs suggestion, which is still a work in progress, holds then we can have a 
unified theory allowing to treat indifferently either indicative either counterfactual 
conditionals. But, the crucial point is to define the passage from K to Kǯ.  
 103 
Elena Nulvesu, Conditional sentences. Truth conditions and probability, 
Tesi di dottorato in ǲScienze dei Sistemi Culturaliǳ, Università degli studi di Sassari. 
Basically, Mura advances a three-step propose--although he is still working to 
better define it: 
(Step 1). Take the whole Boolean algebra B   generated by K.  
(Step 2). Remove the proposition p from B   and everything not separable from 
p in B , generating the corpus K⎯ of remaining information of B . The 
notion of separability is the following:  
 Given a Boolean algebra128 B  and two elements p and q in B --with p, 
q ≠Ͳ--, p and q are said logically separable in B  if and only if there 
are two independent sub-algebras B  and B ǲ of B  such that (i) p 
belongs to B , (ii) q belongs to B , and (iii) B  ׫B  generateB  .129 
(Step 3). Add ~p to K⎯, generating a new corpus Kǯ of information. 
Now, either K or Kǯ generates a Boolean algebra and, technically, a class of 
(logically) possible worlds. Therefore, the problem to move from K to Kǯ is 
essentially the same (concerning the formal logic) of finding a possible world closest 
to the actual one but differing about the antecedent and everything linked to it--and 
nothing more. Stalnaker himself introduced some restriction for a set of worlds 
based on some given or contextual information, so that there is no such a logical 
difference between that set and a stock K of knowledge. The difference concerns a 
metaphysical level. However, the concept of ǲpossible worldǳ was introduced first by Leibniz.130 Indeed, even if in an informally way, he anticipated the basic idea of Stalnakerǯs 
account about conditionals. InThéodicée Leibniz used the following words: 
                                                          
128 The idea to move in a Boolean algebra scenario due to the fact that here two equivalent 
languages correspond to the same (Boolean) algebra. In this way no accidental aspect of the language is introduced, and the famous ǲgrue paradoxǳ of Goodman does not hold. 
129 Mura introduced such a notion of logical separability for the first time in: Alberto Mura, ǲWhen Probabilistic Support is Inductiveǳ, Philosophy of Science, vol. 57, No. 2 (The University of Chicago 
Press: 1990), 278--289.  
130 In a personal conversation Stalnaker told me that he did not have in mind Leibnizǯs concept of 
possible world. In addition, according to Stalnaker, Leibniz gave just a superficial definition, without 
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ǲ[…] Car le cas du siége de Kégila est dǯun monde possible qui ne diffère du nôtre quǯen tout ce qui a liaison avec cette hypothèse, et lǯidée de ce monde possible 
représente ce qui arriverait en ce cas. Donc nous avons un principe de la science certaine des contingents futurs, soit quǯils arrivent actuellement, soit quǯils doivent arriver dans un certain cas.ǳ131 Leibniz limited to talk about a ǲliaisonǳ, that literally means ǲlinkǳ. The relation 
of similarity is a notion due to Stalnaker-Lewisǯ semantics. They interpreted a 
possible world which differs only for all that is related with the hypothesis such as 
the most similar world to the actual one.132 But, actually, Leibniz has never talked in 
terms of similarity. Now, according to Mura, what Leibniz had in mind was, rather, a 
ceteris paribus condition which should not be interpreted in terms of similarity 
between worlds á la Stalnaker. Basically, the idea is: ǲWhen we consider whether a counterfactual A>B is true, we imagine a ceteris 
paribus A-world, one where A holds and other things remain ǲequal.ǳ However, the 
ceteris paribus condition should not be confused with similarity between worlds. 
When we consider (4)[If President Kennedy had pushed the red button during the 
Cuban missile crisis, then there would have been a nuclear Holocaust], for example, 
we hold fixed the causal regularities tying the red button to a missile launch, and 
this means we consider devastated worlds that are radically unlike our own. Exactly 
how ceteris paribusǳ.133 
But how to interpret such a ceteris paribus condition? Mura suggests to explain 
it just in terms of separability, such as reported exactly in the second step defining 
the passage from K to Kǯ. In this way it would be possible avoid a notion of similarity 
                                                          
really develop such an issue. However, Leibniz was the first who mentioned the idea of possible 
world, so that I think it would be interesting get a look at his idea.  
131 Gottfried W. Leibniz and Louis de Jaucourt, Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l'homme et lʹorigine du mal, Vol. 2 (chez François Changuion, 1747), 135. Translated in English as: ǲFor the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible world, which differs from ours only in all 
that is connected with this hypothesis, and the idea of this possible world represents that which 
would happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certain knowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or must happen in a certain case.ǳ Gottfried W. Leibniz, 
Theodicy, ed. Austin M. Farrer (New York: Cosimo, Inc., 2009), 146. 
132 Or the most similar worlds, according to Lewis.  
133 James W. Garson, Modal logic for philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
460--461. 
 105 
Elena Nulvesu, Conditional sentences. Truth conditions and probability, 
Tesi di dottorato in ǲScienze dei Sistemi Culturaliǳ, Università degli studi di Sassari. 
and all those troubles related to it--like that one showed by the example of the 
nuclear Holocaust.134  
  
5. Compound conditionals An important advantage given by Muraǯs account is that every trievent is a 
simple event. Indeed, the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents allows, by de Finettiǯs 
Decomposition Theorem, to simplify every trievent so that each compound 
conditional can be analyzed such as a simple one. In this way, we will be able to extend Adamsǯ logic to compound conditionals. 
I think this is a great result because, although compound conditionals are 
complicated sentences, it is unquestionably we often use some of them in everyday reasoning. So, I consider quite inappropriate Adamsǯ suggestion to give up 
compound conditionals considering them not tractable at all. 
For example, a common compound construction is given by the import-export. 
Therefore, it would be great that a logic of conditionals could preserve such an 
important logical principle. Now, while imp-exp does not hold in Stalnakerǯs 
account, in the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievents it is generally confirmed:135  
o for every ordinary proposition p, q and z, we have the following 
necessary and all together sufficient conditions:136 
 ሺ䕕 ՛ ሺ ݍ ∣ ݌ ሻ ר䕻� ר ~䕻ሺ݌ ר �ሻሻ ՜䕕ݍ. 
 ሺ䕕ݍ ש䕕~ݍሻ ՜ [䕻ሺp ר zሻ ש ~ △ ݌ ש ~ △ �]. 
 ሺሺ䕕ݍ ש䕕~ݍሻ ר △ ݌ ר △ �ሻ ՜䕻ሺ݌ ר �ሻ. 
                                                          
134 Troubles that Lewis himself pointed out at the moment to choose just one world ሺas Stalnakerǯs 
Uniqueness Assumption intends).   
135 Except for a few cases. For example, imp-exp is not generally confirmed with sentences of the 
form p ՜(q ՜p). Indeed, when p and q cannot be both true we have sentences like ǲIf Harry runs 
fifteen miles this afternoon, then if he is killed in a swimming accident this morning, he will run fifteen miles this afternoonǳ. This does not seem a logical truth, but just a paradoxical situation. See 
William G. Lycan, Real Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 82--proposing a Gibbardǯs example. However, imp-exp is always confirmed in de Finettiǯs ሺoriginalሻ trievents. 
136 Where △means ǲfactualǳ, i.e. the proposition can be true or false. 
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 (ሺ䕕ݍ ש䕕~ݍሻ ר ~䕻ሺ݌ ר �) ՜ ሺ~䕻݌ ש ~䕻�ሻ. 
 [ሺ䕕 ՛ ሺ ݍ ∣ ݌ ሻ ש䕕 ՛ ~ሺ ݍ ∣ ݌ ሻ ר䕻�] ՜䕻ሺ݌ ר �ሻ. Another important logical principle, holding either in Stalnakerǯs either in Muraǯs, is the conditional excluded middle--(p >q) ש(p >~q). According to CEM, it 
must be impossible that either p >q either p >~q are both true. But, as previously said, Lewis points out that conditionals like ǲIf Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would be Italianǳ and ǲIf Bizet and Verdi were compatriots, Bizet would not be Italianǳ seem both acceptable.137 In addition, he also complains CEM might help to 
choose the closest world to the actual one. Indeed, is it a world where, if Bizet and 
Verdi were compatriots, then Bizet would be Italian or where Verdi would be 
French?138  
Stalnaker supported CEM by Van Fraassenǯs notion of ǲvaguenessǳ, which allows 
there might be cases where neither p ՜q nor p ՜~q are true. This holds for 
trievents too, because both may be null. In that case, Muraǯs account works (step 1) 
considering the whole Boolean algebra generated by the actual status K where Bizet 
and Verdi are not compatriots, (step 2) eliminating such evidence and everything 
which is not separable from it, (step 3) adding the information that Bizet and Verdi 
are compatriots, generating so a new corpus Kǯ. Finally, if and only if the consequent 
is true in Kǯ, the conditional is true too.  
Now, we cannot believe that a same proposition is either true either false, so that 
I cannot assume contradictory information into a same corpus of knowledge. This 
means, supposing Bizet and Verdi are compatriots, if I assume that Bizet would be 
Italian I cannot think also that he is not. That is, basically, what Stalnaker proposed 
by Van Fraassenǯs. 
  
                                                          
137 See note 64. 
138 See note 63. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Adams provided an account supporting the Equation, according to which the 
probability of a conditional is its conditional probability. This is an important 
intuitive result, and Edgington presented strong arguments in its support. In 
addition, in a first moment, Stalnakerǯs theory coincided with Adamsǯ proposal 
showing that the Equation is generally satisfied with simple conditionals.  Unfortunately, Lewisǯ Triviality Result showed prima facie the incompatibility 
between the assumption that the probability of a proposition is the probability it is 
true and the Equation. Consequently, supporting Stalnakerǯs semantic means to reject Adamsǯ logic--and vice versa. 
In front of the Triviality Result, Stalnaker finally gave up the Equation such as a 
general satisfied principle and suggested to consider conditional sentences as 
standard propositions. Instead, Adams concluded that conditionals do not have 
truth conditions of any kind, developing a non-propositional view. Indeed, he thought that Lewisǯ result holds just because we make the mistake to assign a truth-
value to conditionals, while such sentences are never true or false but simply 
probable or improbable.  
Now, although Adams analyzed conditional sentences in terms of probability--
rather than truth-values--since 1965, he explicitly denied they have any kind of 
truth conditions only after Triviality Result had been formulated. But, saying 
conditionals have a probability that is a conditional probability and holding they 
never own a truth-value mean two different things. Unquestionably, if we have in mind material conditionalǯs truth conditions--interpreting ǲ՜ǳ such as ǲ⊃ǳ--, we will 
meet a lot of troubles. However, that simply means ǲ՜ǳ cannot have the same truth conditions of ǲ⊃ǳ. Adamsǯ idea that conditionals do not have general truth 
conditions emerged just in front of Lewisǯ trivialization. For this reason, I have some doubts about Adamsǯ conclusion if no Triviality Result had been advanced. I want to 
say that to deny conditionals have truth conditions does not look an essential 
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property of conditional sentences, but just an idea developed in front of Lewisǯ 
trivialization. In other word, finding a way to avoid such a result might lead to a 
different conclusion. In addition, I judge quite ǲextremeǳ Adamsǯ suggestion because it is not 
complicate to find in natural language several examples of conditional sentences 
considered true or false by our common sense. Edgington herself admitted--during a 
seminar at University of Sassari--that sometimes a conditional could have a truth-
value. However, although she looked less radical than Adams, she refused to talk in 
terms of general truth conditions. After all, the fact that we are not always able to 
assign a truth-value is unquestionable. Even Stalnaker had to admit--especially after Lewisǯ objections--that sometimes we cannot choose the possible world closest to 
the actual one and, consequently, the conditional is neither true nor false--reason for what he dealt with Van Fraassenǯs supervaluations.  
Therefore, it seems we need a kind of middle way able to fix a truth-value when 
possible and considering null those conditionals we cannot judge neither true nor 
false. But if we want to preserve the Equation--and Adamsǯ logic--we need to avoid 
the Triviality Result too. In such a way we might support the thesis according to 
which the probability of a conditionals is its conditional probability without 
necessarily deny any kind of truth conditions for conditionals.  With this intent, my work considered Muraǯs theory trying to show why the 
Theory of Hypervaluated Trievent may represent a good option. I showed how it has 
been able to avoid the Triviality and to incorporate Adamsǯ logic, extending it to 
every trievent. Demonstrating that every trievent is simple, Mura provided a theory 
able to deal with both simple and compound conditionals, overcoming a limit of Adamsǯs theory. Indeed, even if Adams considered compound conditionals not 
treatable at all--probably because they are too complicate--, we can find many 
examples where such sentences are unquestionably used in every day reasoning. 
However, Muraǯs account is still a work in progress and it is not totally free from 
limits. I presented its problems, but also its advantages. Among them, the 
generalization of the Theory of Hypervaluated Trievent by invoking a corpus K of 
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beliefs, which allows to consider every conditional not indicative or counterfactual 
by itself but in relation to K. It means we can still hope to find a unified theory able 
to catch both kind of conditionals. 
Even Stalnaker introduced some (contextual) restriction for a set of worlds, so 
that there is no such a logical difference between K and that set--at most, the 
difference would concern the metaphysical level. Nevertheless, K should help to avoid those problems related to a ǲpossible worldǳ. For example, problems about 
defining an elusive concept like that of ǲsimilarity between worldsǳ. Although 
Stalnaker said he had never explicitly talked about a ǲsimilarity relationǳ, given that 
this notion is certainly invoked in some way, I think it should be definitely 
formalized. Indeed, Lewis tried to give a properly logical definition for such a tricky 
idea but it did not sound exhaustive. 
In conclusion, I wanted to show that it would be worth to analyze the problem of 
conditionals by a different point of view, hoping that my work could have helped in 
treating these complex sentences.  
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